On October 20th, ATPF Senior Fellow Dr. Hussein Ibish participated in a panel entitled “McCain, Obama, and the Middle East: The influence of Domestic Politics on U.S. Policy” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Panelists included Graeme Bannerman, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute and Former Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Aaron David Miller, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and former U.S. Middle East Negotiator; and Richard Straus, Editor, Middle East Policy Survey and Former Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee. The panel delved into a number of issues, ranging from how Arabs and Arab Americans are involved politically as players, to a study of how AIPAC has become the most successful ethnic lobby on Capitol Hill. The group focused throughout on the question of not whether, but how, domestic politics would affect US foreign policy.

Dr. Ibish began by citing numerous instances in which domestic political forces had affected US foreign policy in the Middle East, giving the example of the Dubai ports deal in 2005 which was almost derailed by public opinion, and threats to the long-standing US-Saudi relationship in 2002 and 2003 following many allegations in the media that the Saudi government was wittingly or unwittingly responsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. He noted that public opinion will rarely break through long standing policy, and that it is for this reason that ATFP’s goal of redefining the discussion on establishing a Palestinian state is so critical to success. When the idea of zero-sum relations between Israel on the one hand and the Palestinians and other Arabs on the other hand has been debunked, the American discourse can be changed to focus on how a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security is in the national interests of Israel, Palestine and especially the United States. He stressed the importance of understanding that an agreement to end the conflict and the occupation is not only in the Palestinian, Arab and American interests, but also in the Israeli national interest as well, and that American policy can therefore serve both Palestinian and Israeli interests, as well as American interests, at the same time. Dr. Ibish concluded by stating that the strong majority of public opinion in the United States in favor of a two state solution to Middle East peace could be deployed by a determined and engaged president to overcome resistance from special interests.

Richard Straus noted that American Jews are heavily engaged politically as an ethnic group, but that the activism stems from a passion for political change and philanthropy. He described critical moments in defining the Israeli-American relationship, dwelling on the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the tenure of George Schultz, whom he described as the first Secretary of State to enter office with pro-Arab tendencies and become increasingly sympathetic to Israel (rather than the more usual pattern which is the reverse). In Straus’s view, the PLO realized in 1988 that the road to Jerusalem did not go through Washington, but rather, the road to Washington goes through Jerusalem, stressing the strength of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States.

Graeme Bannerman addressed the question of the power of domestic ethnic lobbies, focusing particularly on AIPAC, as well as two other long-standing institutions: the Greek lobby and the Armenian lobby. He discussed how the strength of the pro-Israel lobby has grown, and that one of the most important events in this process was when two senators blamed their defeats for re-election on the Israel lobby, and the organizations were happy to take the credit. He suggested that the perception of this power is somewhat exaggerated since there were many other factors that produced these electoral outcomes. However, he suggested that preemptive self-censorship has become the norm in American politics on issues regarding Israel because of the perceived power of lobbying groups. He described the US-Israel relationship as a “passionate attachment,” of the kind warned against by President George Washington.

The panel moderator and final discussant, Aaron David Miller, explored what he called “value affinities” between Israel and the United States, and how they help shape an a priori tilt towards Israel in American political life. He said that cultural similarities such as valuing democracy and a multicultural society, and other common traits between the US and Israel formed the basis of strong ties between the two countries and their citizens. However, Miller identified a serious flaw in US-Israeli relations, in that the US too often acts as a “lawyer for Israel” in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, rather than promoting American interests as such. By taking sides between the two parties, the United States is unable to act as an effective mediator in talks to end the conflict. He listed a series of what he described as lawyers for Israel in US domestic politics: 1) the Jewish community in the US; 2) a well established congressional lobby that facilitates pro Israel legislation and statements by members of Congress; 3) millions of evangelical Christians; 4) some self-defeating Arab leaders and those in the Arab world who find themselves co-opted by the likes of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and 5) the Israel Prime Minister, whoever that might be, whose relationships with the Secretary of State and President is a major factor in shaping overall US policy towards Israel.

In Miller’s opinion, the Israel lobby has won the fundamental contest over a permanent alliance between the US and Israel. It has successfully intertwined the two cultures and countries, and barring a fundamental change in thinking that would take an entire generation to develop, the US-Israel relationship is and will remain strong. Miller argued that, counterintuitively, the United States is still serving as a mediator because rather than in spite of its established partiality within negotiations. He called this the paradox of the partial mediator, but in Miller’s mind, it is what gives the US a spot at the negotiating process. Miller critiqued the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations for what he perceived to be a shift from a special relationship with Israel to an exclusive relationship over the past 16 years, one that is fundamentally unhealthy for both parties due to its exclusivity.

Video of Wilson Center Briefing