In light of the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Arab concerns that forced decision makers to respond and agree to Hamas’s repetitive calls and strong interest in holding an official meeting and having talks with the Jordanian state, a meeting took place between the head of intelligence and a delegation of the political arm of Hamas. This political change and reassessment of national interests occurred for the Jordanian decision makers, and not for Hamas, since Hamas’s calls for and interest in talks did not stop, but did not bear a fruit until the Jordanian decision makers came to realize their benefits holding talks with Hamas’s delegation.
This meeting had preconditions from both sides, and both sides are studying, developing, and building on a foundation for understanding that is free of manipulation, duplicity, or technicalities. Both know what benefits them, and both are being transparent because they know the other party and its interests as well as it knows itself and its own interests.
In light of my confirmed information, the Jordanian decision was not reached in without the knowledge of the Palestinian President, and he has been included on the details, mechanisms, and results of the talks, either directly by the intelligence head Mohamed AL-Thahabi or through Jordanian officials informing Palestinian officials of the latest developments. This is due to more than one reason, but most important is the fact that there is a practical, yet unwritten, cooperation between the Palestinian and Jordanian leaderships that involves dialogue, an understanding of future steps, and coordinating positions as a result of the connected interests between Amman and Ramallah.
This is evident in confronting the Israeli expansion project and its effects, the Jordanian role at the Hague, the speeches of the King to the Congress and European parliaments, and their shared position on Jerusalem. All of these are part of the Jordanian responsibility towards Palestine and against Israel, or their responsibility in confronting the aggressive agenda of Hamas.
The clarity and firmness of the Jordanian position towards Hamas preceded its coup in 2007, and the exit of Khaled Meshal from Amman preceded that by many years because Hamas’s political project, which extends beyond borders, not only is dangerous to Palestine and the Palestinian national project, but is also dangerous to the national security of Jordan.
The confrontation between Jordan and Hamas was not because of Hamas’s coup against Palestinian legitimacy and the Palestinian national project, but is purely due to Jordanian reasons. This explains the firm Jordanian position against Hamas’s coup, since the coup confirmed the Jordanian view of how to deal with Hamas, which is a position that no other Arab country has practiced, and that is because dealing with Hamas is a uniquely Jordanian national security issue.
The Jordanian position and policy of isolating Hamas was not due to Abbas’s or Fatah’s wishes, and the decision to receive Hamas’s delegation was not due to provoking the Palestinian leadership and wasn’t a sign of Jordan’s disapproval of Palestine’s role or performance. The isolation took place for Jordanian reasons and motives, and resuming the relationship was also for Jordanian reasons.
It is true that there were Palestinian, Arab, and international factors that assisted in developing the Jordanian position and pushing it towards accepting Hamas’s calls for holding talks and establishing an understanding, but that occurred because it benefits the Jordanian national security interest.
Hamas is a part of a political group that extends beyond borders, and has an agenda of attacking regimes and establishments in a gradual fashion. Just as happened in Palestine, where it used the elections to attack the Palestinian Authority and seize control, regardless of whether Mohamed Dahlan was there or not, it is now carrying out its plan against Ahmad Hales, member of the revolutionary council of Fatah, who supported Hamas and was an ally to it during its confrontation with Mohamed Dahlan.
Hamas won’t stop until it eliminates all the organizational, partisan and public existence of Fatah in the Gaza strip, and will do the same to the other factions including Islamic jihad and the family of Momtaz Deghmesh and his “Islamic army.”
Hamas is part of and an extension of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood opposition movement in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Kuwait, and is a partner in governing Sudan, Iraq, Palestine, and Somalia. Nothing will “turn its head” other than its control and domination of authority in all the countries it is in, and its “change and reform” policies are only a cover for what it actually seeks to achieve, through a gradual multi-step program.
[Translation by Mike Husseini of ATFP]
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