The opportunity is ripe now for a distinguished Arab role in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon and with both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is also an urgent need to formulate and develop this role both for defensive and offensive purposes. Arabs have no more excuses to be absent or to abstain from assuming this role because hiding behind pretexts, such as weakness, helplessness or impatience today will earn them nothing but deep regrets in the future. To start with, Iraq is once again on the verge of collapse if the current lack of balance in political equations persists. Arabs are required to have a direct, immediate and effective role to circumvent those who oppose this role and at the same time to preserve Iraq's independence by infusing balance into Iraq's political equation. Likewise, Palestine can no longer tolerate the traditional Arab strategy of appeasing the different factions and seeking reconciliation. Instead, Palestine needs a new Arab strategy that will make a clear demand on those paralyzing the Palestinian Authority to stop their obstruction right away. The Arab effort must act in multiple directions at the same time and must focus at this turning point on supporting the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's proposition to hand over the border crossing controls to the Palestinian Authority. In Lebanon, the Arabs must stop criticizing the Lebanese, especially as they know that the blame for the crisis lies with the Syrians and the Iranians. It is time they put their money where their mouths are, especially as Iran is injecting both funds and weapons and conducting military training while publicly denying all that, as its Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki did in Davos without even blinking. As for the American-Iranian relations, sometimes developed through dialogue over Iraq and through Swiss channels, Arabs must decide to have a role in those relations, whether the Iranians and Americans like it or not, so long as the exciting Iranian-American dialogue is not bilateral in nature but centers around the fate of the Arabs.
On the Iraqi front, the domestic political developments in Iraq must be assessed in order to benefit from the willingness of the Kurds to reconsider what was assumed as a guarantee of balance in Iraq's political equation. In the past, Iraq's Kurds assumed that an alliance with the Shiites would breed a new rule in Iraq. Today, however, they have realized that Iraq must be governed through a balanced Shiite-Kurdish-Sunni formula, especially after the heated debates among Kurdish leaderships led to the conclusion that they have no political future in an era of power monopoly. In other words, Kurdish leaders have finally learned that their support for Nouri Al-Maliki has enabled him to monopolize power and authority. In light of this assessment, they have realized the need for alternative alliances far more substantial than merely shifting support from Nouri Al-Maliki of the Da'wa Party to Adel Abdul-Mehdi from the "Higher Council." In brief, they have realized the need to restore balance into the Iraqi equation. If Al-Maliki endorses the reforms desired by the Kurds, then be it. If not, then other alternatives are available.
One of the most important breakthroughs offered by the Kurds to the Arab states is the window of opportunity for "other alternatives." Some Kurdish leaders have made it clear to the Arabs that this is an open invitation for them to exploit the outcomes of the Kurdish assessment, that is, an invitation to play a direct role in Iraq. From their viewpoint, the currently improving security conditions in Iraq will "disappear" within weeks not years, as they warn, if no real reforms are implemented. In their opinion, Arabs must be effectively and actively involved in Iraq, especially at this stage of the American relationship with Iraq and the American-Iranian relationship in Iraq. Several paths of action are available. For instance, the diplomatic exchange may be elevated to embassy levels instead of diplomacy by proxy. In addition, the Arab influence in the Iraqi file may be exerted at the Iraqi, regional and international levels. Neither Tehran nor al-Maliki's government wants an effective Arab role in Iraq. Instead, they prefer complicating this role in view of excluding it. To overcome this rejection, Arabs must take risks even amid difficult security conditions. In addition, they should make moves with clear understanding that the outcome of the struggle over the region will be determined by the future of Iraq.
On the regional front, a so-called "great regional deal" is out of the question with Iran being such a major regional power and as long as it deliberately pursues a confrontation with the US that will carry it from being a regional power to the ranks of great international powers. Even if the American-Iranian relationship is in the process of leading to that great deal in which Iraq plays a central role, the absence or exclusion of Arabs from this deal will harm both Arab and Iraqi interests. When Tehran and Damascus decided to cooperate with the US in Iraq, each had its reasons. Syria cooperated because it feared and still seriously fears the growing strength of "Al-Qaeda" on its territories. Acting as a pathway for "Al-Qaeda" militants into Iraq to defeat American troops was partially turning its territories into a base for "Al-Qaeda," which sent shivers forcing the Syrian regime to cooperate.
Tehran, on the other hand, cooperated out of fear that its continued escalation against the American troops through the militias it supports in Iraq may lead to the collapse of the Shiite rule project in Iraq. Hence, it preferred to cooperate hoping by so doing to protect Al-Maliki's government and the Shiite interests in Iraq and to occasionally speak on behalf of Iraq. Mottaki considered the call for the withdrawal of American troops as "an Iraqi decision," pointing out that neighbors should refrain from meddling in the domestic affairs of their neighbors. In his opinion, had the US presence been an occupation, the Iranians would have fought it themselves. In addition, he spoke about the need to preserve the security progress through radical solutions to political problems. He also urged all Iraqi sides to assume responsibility since in his opinion, hard work is needed to transform what he described as a "ceasefire" among the Iraqis today into a "permanent peace" for Iraq. Iraq is not only trapped between ceasefires and pretenses of coexistence and harmony in peace. It is also, as someone put it, the victim of the "conflict of revenues and wills." On the one hand, the American role in Iraq is linked to several ambitions that include military bases and oil revenues. On the other hand, Iran's role seeks more than just a pro-Iranian Shiite rule in Iraq as Iran bears oil and strategic dimensions in mind.
Evidently, the struggle in Iraq is enormous, not only over the future of the American role, but also over the future of Iran's role in Iraq. Protecting the future of Iraq demands a balanced regional environment and Arabs must instantly be part of it, especially that Iran tolerates a security vacuum there and has even taken all the necessary measures to fill this void. Hence, just as both Iran and Syria have an interest in creating a vacuum in Lebanon to obstruct the presidential elections and impose a presidential void, they seek a similar vacuum in Iraq to serve tactical and strategic objectives at the same time.
The Iranians went to Davos to take advantage of the "podium" as one of them put it. Iran's rulers enjoyed that podium to the point that they invited the president of the Forum, Klaus Schwab, to hold a regional conference in Iran similar to the ones held in the Dead Sea in Jordan or in Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt, only according to the rules of the Islamic Republic, as Mottaki proposed. This implies the exclusion of Israelis and the careful selection of the appropriate guests from the point of view of the Islamic Republic. As one of the Iranian participants at Davos elaborated in one of the Forum's meetings, even if a brilliant scientist plans to present the most critical proposition for the future of the world, he cannot do so if he happens to be homosexual because from an Iranian point of view, such a "pervert" has no right to exist in the first place. Accordingly, such a scientist can only present his proposition once he has undergone the necessary surgery to correct his perversion.
In one of the public sessions attended by the consultant to the Iranian president, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki and the US ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad, the two Iranian officials diligently lectured, expressed toughness, and rejected flexibility under any circumstances. They asked: Why should Iran be excluded from nuclear monitoring? Why should the Islamic Republic be subject to strict investigation of its nuclear program? Why Iran alone but not others? This is racial discrimination.
What is wrong with Iran's desire to be a principal part of the solution? It is not true at all that Iran is part of the problem. The Islamic Republic vehemently denies the absolutely false allegations about arming militias. The Islamic Republic is innocent and courageous, insisting on seeing things as it has determined to perceive them on its own way. It has no interest in learning, but rather, in lecturing and in informing the world that it has no intentions to change. The Iranian delegation at Davos used the International Atomic Energy Agency and its director, Mohamed Al-Baradei as its best defense, especially since the IAEA director has helped and continues to aid Iran's Mullahs in their main attempt to keep Iran's nuclear file out of the Security Council in New York (where the ghost of increasing the sanctions lurks), and to return it to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna where Iran believes it has a friend who has deliberately acted as an accomplice with the Iranians to dismantle the demand for Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition unanimously agreed upon by the 5 permanent member states at the Security Council.
The IAEA and Al-Baradei were shocked by the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which reported that Iran had suspended its military nuclear program in 2003. They were shocked only because the IAEA under Al-Baradei has discovered that Iran already "possessed" the military nuclear program it allegedly "suspended" in 2003. If the IAEA is excused because it does not possess resources similar to those at the disposal of state intelligence agencies, it may be better off with some humility because the combination of ignorance and pretentiousness could be too serious. With respect to the nuclear issue, the Iranian message was: What is wrong with you? If you have managed to wait all this long, why not wait another 40 days until the IAEA presents its report. Mottaki said, "Exercise restraint - this is what we advised them," in reference to the five permanent member states at the Security Council, adding "and leave your final decisions" as to tightening sanctions "until after" the Agency's report.
Of Lebanon Motakki spoke with flagrant superiority and obnoxious denial, saying that the reports about Iran's arming of Hezbollah were nothing but "allegations." He also denied that his country was training militias in Iraq. He added, "The Americans have reached the awareness and conclusion that they have to support the Maliki government which enjoys a quasi-consensus." In this respect, he called for tangible aid by "delegating more tangible authority" to the government, i.e. by "handing over the security dossier to the Maliki government," among others. But is Iran willing to stop training the Iraqi factions? Mottaki's response is too Iranian when he says, "We seek no war with any state…no matter how provoked we are."
Thus goes the Iranian story at this point: training, funding and supporting militias in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (without admitting it) while sending a clear and official message that all this training and funding for the militias does not aim at a comprehensive all-out war. War, after all, is a strategic decision, whereas supporting "Hezbollah" against the Lebanese state, "Hamas" against the Palestinian Authority, and the Shiite militias against balanced governance in Iraq, are merely tactical battles that claim Arab people, not Persians.
The Islamic Republic is clearly interested in excluding the Arabs from all these critical files in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. The Arab resolve (which will undoubtedly exclude Syria and Qatar) must be clear to all concerned parties as they are surprisingly informed that Arabs will immediately engage in all these issues with a new and viable strategy, a strategy with teeth which says: We are truly and seriously present. We will deter any attempts or whims to exclude us or keep us away.
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