The deadlock in the Palestinian political scene is not a historical coincidence or the result of a single factor, but of many.

Some factors are related to the Palestinians themselves and their internal interactions, for which the Palestinians are fully responsible. Some are objectively related to the broader context of the conflict in which the Palestinians are fighting to restore their usurped national rights. Others are related to the troubled region in which the Palestinians live and interact. The inevitable result of those interactions is that the Palestinians, in many considerations, are the most affected party. The Palestinians have been on the losing side since the beginning of the conflict, in all its various aspects.

An objective cost-benefit analysis indicates, with much certainty, that the Palestinians are losing more than they are winning. This is not intended to point fingers. It is more useful to try to set a vision and develop strategies that can improve the Palestinians’ lot. Palestinians have the ability to formulate a strategy that will bring them closer to realizing their aspirations in the midst of current conditions.

Once again, a quick estimation indicates that Palestinians are losing more than they are winning, and that there are many factors causing that. The Palestinians should examine their political performance and plans, work to identify their problems and develop strategic visions capable of moving the Palestinian project forward.

Because of the dead end we have reached and because we are unable to take advantage of the current situation, which is greatly harming our interests and our ability to achieve our national dream, we need to develop our political machinery in order to move closer to achieving our project. If we look at our situation objectively, we will find that our situation is miserable.

If the essence of the Palestinian liberation struggle is the recovery of Palestine and the Palestinian people’s right to return to their homeland and achieve independence, then the tools we have been using up to now will not get us closer to that goal.

The armed struggle was weakened by a long series of truces that have merely maintained the status quo. Negotiating to achieve a two-state solution has also failed, because Israel never missed an opportunity to undermine that solution. The once-promising Arab Spring is disintegrating and the opportunity for democracy is slipping away. Palestine’s interior is stuck with the stagnant reconciliation process. Simply put, the Palestinians are not fighting, negotiating, reconciling nor working toward anything real. In conclusion, the Palestinians must find a way out of this impasse.

First, they should identify their strengths and weaknesses. This is a difficult task and requires openness, humility and responsibility. We should not inflate ourselves to bigger than we are. We already tried and failed at that. We should be self-aware enough to identify our mistakes and learn from experience. Truth and honesty are crucial to this process.

Identifying our strengths, which do not necessarily mean physical force, would improve the Palestinians’ political advantage. Moreover, the sources of our strength may not only come from the Palestinians themselves. There is a need for a real examination on the nature and source of our strength, and how the Palestinians can benefit from it, and the same applies to the nature and source of our weakness. That includes answering deeper questions about what affects our strengths and weaknesses and how the Palestinians can translate that into political strength in practice.

Studying the mechanisms by which Palestinians have succeeded in improving their conditions and their place during the various stages of the conflict will greatly help develop a new strategy for the Palestinian liberation struggle. There have certainly been many moments when the Palestinians made clear progress and were not just passive recipients of enemy policies, nor the directives of our Arab brothers, who lost Palestine while their armies stood by awaiting orders that never came.

The start of the Palestinian revolution in 1965 was a unique phenomenon that succeeded in improving the conditions of the Palestinian struggle. Of course, this historic moment included other moments within it in which the Palestinians were transformed from mere refugees looking to lead their lives in refugee camps to freedom fighters with a political discourse that expresses their national aspirations and hopes as well as captures the sympathy of the free world, in some cases at the official level.

Studying the history of the contemporary Palestinian struggle reveals many moments when the Palestinians were strong, moments that could help us set the objectively favorable conditions that might improve the Palestinians’ position in the conflict.

The First Intifada was the defining moment in Palestinian national history in terms of experience, influence and the nature of the fight. An adequate and deep review of the uprising and its methods after 25 years reveals that Palestinians have failed to draw from the lessons learned  during the intifada.

Such a review would reveal the options available and help form the strategy and the tactics needed to achieve the national aspirations of Palestinians and start a new revolution that would serve their interests.