The conventional wisdom in Israel holds that Hamas-Fateh reconciliation is detrimental to the peace process. The main argument is that Hamas is a spoiler of the negotiations process because it is a radical Islamic movement guided by a virulent anti-Israel ideology that preaches elimination of the state of Israel. Successful reconciliation would endow Hamas with veto power to block any attempt to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

There is also much concern that Hamas will win the elections that are planned as a stage in the reconciliation process and as a result will take control of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. This would end any possibility of a viable peace process. Accordingly, Israeli government policies as well as those of the United States strongly oppose the Palestinian reconciliation process. These policies are practiced through threats aimed at the PLO and PA: to cut transfer of tax money collected by Israel for the PA as well as other financial aid, and to stop negotiating with the PLO and the PA.

Cynically, it is possible to argue that to a large extent these arguments are absurd and the threats empty--that this is like discussing the killing of someone who is already dead. The peace process is dead anyway. If there have been no real negotiations for the past two years, what is the meaning of discussing the effect of reconciliation on the peace process and threatening to stop it? The survival of the PA is an Israeli and American interest, so what is the sense of causing its financial bankruptcy?

Yet on a more serious note, one needs to analyze the reasons for the stalemate in the peace process and to deduce from this analysis whether reconciliation will make it more difficult or easier to revive this process.

It seems that the main reason for the deadlock is each side's deep conviction that there is zero probability the other will be willing to conclude a permanent status agreement their own party can live with. On the Israeli side, there are also grave doubts whether the PLO and the PA are capable of implementing any agreement the two parties do conclude. One of the main reasons for these doubts is the division between Fateh and Hamas and the latter's growing power. Hamas governs the Gaza Strip and no agreement can be implemented there without its consent. There is also concern that the "Arab spring" is only going to augment Hamas' power.

The main implication is that we should either wait for political changes among Palestinians and Israelis that enable them to make the tough concessions needed for a permanent status agreement and to implement it--assuming these political changes do eventually take place and that prolongation of the status quo does not create an irreversible situation--or, alternatively, that we devise a new political process that enables gradual progress towards the hoped-for two-state solution.

It seems that the second approach is much more realistic and makes more sense. In this context, Palestinian reconciliation has the potential to facilitate such a gradual process that includes partial and limited agreements or even unilateral steps. The main reason is that Hamas has the capacity to be a partner to this kind of process. This reflects two factors.

First, this kind of process does not force Hamas to completely forego its ideology and its declared policies. The movement will probably not be required to recognize Israel until a later stage of the process--unlike under Quartet conditions that demand recognition as a precondition for any Hamas participation. Hamas has repeatedly declared its willingness to enter into agreement with Israel based on a long-term "hudna" (armistice) in the framework of which a Palestinian state is established. Right now, Hamas' conditions for a hudna cannot be accepted by Israel, but that is the purpose of negotiations--to bridge the gaps between the two parties' positions.

Second, Hamas has an interest in participating in such a process. Since becoming a political player in the legitimate Palestinian political arena, participating in elections and seeking to join the PLO, Hamas has a strong interest in being perceived by the Palestinian population as catering to Palestinians' basic interests: to raise families in an environment where they can live peacefully, enjoy basic human rights and have a reasonable life and a future.

That is also the main message of the Arab spring. It is quite evident that Hamas wishes to be perceived as part of the Arab spring and not another dictatorial clique. For the very same reasons, Hamas has an interest in becoming a legitimate player in the international arena.

Those who fear that Hamas will eventually become the dominant political force in the PA and the PLO have of course reason to be concerned, especially as we witness the rise of Islamic movements all over the Middle East. Yet this dynamic reflects a strong momentum in the present Middle East that can probably not be stopped by artificially sabotaging internal political processes such as Fateh-Hamas reconciliation. Trying to influence the policies of these Islamic movements is a more promising line of action.