In those terrible days 10 years ago, when Palestinian terror was striking at Israeli civilians almost daily in the streets of the cities of Israel, there were those who argued that terror could not be defeated by military means, while some said that it could not be defeated by military means alone and others argued that terror can and should be defeated solely by military means.

After the Passover massacre at the Park Hotel in Netanya in April 2002, the argument was settled. The IDF's Operation Defensive Shield effectively put an end to the Palestinian terror that originated from the areas of Judea and Samaria. It was done by military means alone. The renewed presence of the IDF in Judea and Samaria has since then provided the real-time intelligence information and the ability that is required to discover terrorist cells before they become active and to eliminate them. Defeating terror required the elimination of the capability to carry out terrorist attacks. As long as that capability exists there will be terror. It is an example that has been studied by others facing the threat of terror.

This lesson was forgotten four years later during the Second Lebanon War. After Israel was bombarded by Hezbollah rockets for weeks, and Hezbollah made a point of launching rockets against Israel right up to the cease-fire, it was left in possession of an arsenal of rockets that since has grown to tens of thousands - many of them have sufficient range to cover all of Israel. This time Israel was defeated by terror. Since then the threat of Hezbollah terror continues to hang over Israel and has grown to terrifying proportions. We don't need Hassan Nasrallah's recent warnings or last week's civil defense exercises to remind us of that.

There is some comfort in that Israel's failure in the Second Lebanon War has been investigated by the Winograd Commission and mistakes made have been identified. The question is whether the relevant lessons have been drawn. It is not at all clear that the planners of the IDF's Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip two years later took full account of the lessons from the failure of the Second Lebanon War. Here too Hamas bombarded civilians in the cities and villages of southern Israel throughout the three-week operation, including the day of the cease-fire.

The cease-fire left the terrorists in the Gaza Strip in possession of an arsenal of rockets which has grown substantially since then. So that Israel should not forget it, every few weeks rockets are being launched against Israeli civilians in the south. The capability to carry out terrorist acts against Israel from Gaza was not eliminated by Operation Cast Lead, and like Anton Chekhov's gun on the theater stage, their rockets will be launched sooner or later.

That we can seek protection under an umbrella of rocket interception systems like the Iron Dome is an illusion, and that we can tolerate a situation where a million Israelis are being sent to bomb shelters every few weeks is something we'd better not try to get used to. So far the terrorists in Gaza have the upper hand. Score up another defeat for Israel.

And though it may be a bitter pill to swallow for Israelis, the Gilad Shalit saga was another defeat of Israel by the terrorists in Gaza. Israel had every right to celebrate his return after over five years in captivity, but we'd better not forget that we were actually marking a defeat, a strategic defeat with long-term implications. Praising ourselves for our national solidarity and for the value we attach to each individual life cannot change the fact that this was another victory for terror. Many more defeats like that for Israel will portend great danger, and we should understand just what went wrong, so that it does not happen again.

We can be sure of one thing - there will be further abductions of Israelis, soldiers or civilians. Why were we not able to find Shalit prior to Operation Cast Lead, during that operation and after the operation? What action should have been taken to find him, and who should have been charged with taking that action? Was this solely the responsibility of the Security Services, or of the IDF, or of a combined team? Who should have been responsible for setting up such a team? We are in urgent need to find the answers to these questions, if we do not want to suffer another defeat at the hands of terrorists.