The recent reconciliation deal between Hamas and Fatah could hold more merit than past deals between the two parties. Since both parties need unity in the face of the present changes in the Middle East, its survival prospects are stronger than before.

One could argue that the deal reflects subtle changes in Hamas's attitude towards the Palestinian Authority and indeed hesitant acceptance of Fayyadism. This would not be entirely surprising. The institution-building and economic development that prime minister Salam Fayyad is carrying out in the West Bank, successfully or otherwise, is in principle similar to the Islamisation rolled out by Hamas. Fayyadism focuses internally on the development and growth of the Palestinian social, economic and hard infrastructure as the embryonic state moves, despite occupation, towards a declaration of independence at the UN general assembly.

In a secular way, this approach mirrors aspects within Hamas that focus internally on Palestinian society by instilling values into the population through the movement's vast social and civil infrastructure.

Both approaches seek to strengthen Palestinians for future statehood and are as a result somewhat compatible. That is not to say that Hamas has given up resistance, because despite Fatah's objections it continues to see resistance as one means to ending the occupation.

This is not to say, either, that Hamas does not despise Fayyad; it does – because of his dependence on foreign aid, his cosiness with the western powers, his willingness to negotiate with Israel and not least his secularism and personal background.

Still, the two Palestinian movements are at a point where they have strong complementary features which are becoming even more so in the face of current regional changes. Therefore, unlike past reconciliations, this deal could be more than just the empty rhetoric of fraternal love; it could actually hold the semblances of "compatibility in the interim".

Apart from that, both Palestinian parties recognise that a united front could empower them in the months ahead. Within the Palestinian movement, Fatah is gearing to declare an independent Palestine in September, and is creating a reality which Hamas needs to contend with.

Regionally, the wave of Arab revolutions is changing the geopolitical reality for both movements. The fall of President Mubarak in Egypt leaves Fatah in a particularly vulnerable position, one that is potentially favourable to Hamas, while the unravelling of the Syrian regime provides Hamas with challenges of its own. An added pressure for Hamas is the challenge within Gaza from Salafi parties that view Hamas as a moderate player.

Stakes are high. Hamas, frequently the opponent of reconciliation talks, has been pragmatic. Despite often opting for ideological purity at the expense of its popularity ratings, Hamas this time chose to risk ideological compromise for political security.

So Hamas is playing it safe – to protect itself against the tumultuous changes in the region, and to ensure it has a political role in Palestine's future beyond September.

The Palestinian Authority equally needs this deal, as Hamas is a much-needed element in Fayyad's quest for statehood. It integrates Hamas into the political system, thereby reducing potential dissent and resistance. In doing this, Fatah is pre-empting complications that may be caused by an Egyptian regime that is more friendly towards the Islamic movement than it has been in the past.

Despite potential disagreement internally within each of the movements, the deal provides strength for both of them in the face of regional changes.

In the past, of course, Hamas and Fatah have had many rounds of reconciliation, periods of tension, bouts of civil war and exaggerated calls of fraternity. Previous agreements brokered by Egypt and Saudi Arabia usually fell apart after a few months.

In some ways, this latest deal is especially vulnerable as it has received only a lukewarm reception from some key Palestinian figures. Still, this might be a positive indication as it shows the deal is being driven by the parties, rather than individuals, and it is being shaped by mutual needs.

While competitiveness might eventually kick in between the parties, the mutual need for unity at present is buying time for the international community to engage. The EU and the US are until now showing flexibility and waiting for details of the deal to be known before deciding whether or not to treat the unity government as a partner for peace.

Rather than immediately adopting a rejectionist stance – as happened after Hamas's election victory in 2006, the EU should resist Israeli and American calls to boycott a unity government. Similarly, President Obama should learn from his predecessor's mistakes and seek out potential moderation from within Hamas before pursuing a surreptitious policy of marginalisation.

Israel, meanwhile, should stop offering its condescending ultimatum to Fatah to choose between Hamas and a peace process that has already faltered. Rather, it should recognise, perhaps to its chagrin, that there might finally be a Palestinian partner it could negotiate with.