When it became clear a month ago that American and Israeli officials were negotiating a partial, one-time, 90-day Israeli settlement construction freeze in exchange for American military hardware and diplomatic guarantees, few analysts applauded.
Related

Israel Says It Will Permit More Exports From Gaza (December 9, 2010)
Instead, they asked: Would pro-settler Israeli cabinet ministers accede to another freeze? Would the Palestinians accept a freeze that did not include East Jerusalem? And beyond that, how could the two sides solve enough in 90 days to prevent the talks from collapsing and, in the worst case, setting off violence?

With Tuesday’s announcement that the White House had abandoned that approach and was no longer asking for a settlement freeze, it became clear that those questions had grown too big to ignore. Officials said that every element of the deal posed profound difficulties, and that the wisest course was to step back and start over.

It was a rare acknowledgment by the administration that the path it had chosen was failing and that another was needed. But it was also something else: an accusation against each side.

The Israelis had insisted that the only way forward was through direct talks. Yet when those talks began in September, the Israelis engaged in little substance. The Palestinians had insisted that there could be no direct talks without a settlement freeze, yet they waited nine months into the last such freeze before agreeing to negotiate. Now the administration wants to plunge forward — without direct talks and without a freeze — and demand substantive engagement from each side right away through American officials.

The Palestinians are unhappy with this turn of events. The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, said there was no doubt that the peace process was in “a difficult crisis.” His aides said he would consult first with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on Thursday and then with the Arab League this weekend before taking a step. Meanwhile, despairing of the prospects of attaining a negotiated deal, the Palestinians have begun pursuing an alternative: asking the world to recognize their state. To date, Argentina and Brazil have agreed.

Still, Palestinian leaders indicated that they were not closing off American-brokered talks; they know that all the recognition in the world can only pressure Israel. It will not, on its own, either end settlement building or create the reality of a sovereign state.

When reached by telephone in Cairo, Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, said he held Israel responsible for the failure. But asked if he could envision peace negotiations if settlement building continued, he replied: “I’m not saying anything. The call is not mine. The call is of the Palestinian leadership.”

For months, Mr. Erekat had said something else: there could be no direct talks while settlement building took place.

The Israeli reaction to the American decision was relief. A second settlement freeze was viewed as unnecessary and politically painful to achieve. And the idea that the borders of the future Palestinian state could be agreed on in 90 days was considered virtually impossible.

Uzi Arad, the Israeli national security adviser and a confidant of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told Army Radio that the Palestinian expectation for the borders of a future Palestinian state to be agreed upon in that 90-day period was unrealistic and that the Americans realized that.

Borders, other officials here said, cannot be negotiated without taking into account security measures and Jerusalem; if 17 years of talks had not been enough to solve those so far, 90 days would surely not be either.

“The Americans were looking at day 91, and they were worried,” a senior Israeli official said.

Administration officials came to the realization that the issue of settlements was one among a clutch of difficult ones: Jerusalem, borders, security and Palestinian refugees. Any one of them placed ahead of the others would become a roadblock to progress. Now it was settlements, but if the issues were sequenced in another way, a different problem would surely arise. So they decided to re-examine the sequencing.

Israeli officials indicated that with a settlement freeze off the table, they could be more forthcoming on other issues, including changes in their occupation on the ground in the West Bank. A new Palestinian city waiting to be built needs Israeli agreement for a key access road, and that will probably now come, they said; more roadblocks and checkpoints can be removed and more responsibility handed over to Palestinian security forces.

Of course, these steps have been promised several times in the past, and Palestinians are highly skeptical of Israeli sincerity.

But Mr. Netanyahu’s aides say it will be easier to get such steps through his cabinet and security establishment if the threat of talks ending is removed. Because in the coming weeks there will be no direct talks, just indirect ones through American officials, the threat is gone for now.

Ron Dermer, a top aide to Mr. Netanyahu, said Wednesday on Israel Radio that the Americans did not blame the prime minister for the need to refashion the policy, that relations were in fact very good.

“I have to tell you, the coordination between us and the Americans is perhaps at the best since Netanyahu entered office,” he said. Asked what would happen now, he made clear that in the near term there would be indirect talks: “In my opinion, there will be contacts between us and the Americans. The Americans will also talk to the Palestinians.”

He added: “I think it is better to be on a sure path that will bring some kind of result than continue on a path that will lead in the end to failure. I think we have to wait a little more, maybe a few weeks, and in my opinion, with coordination with the Americans, we will be on a new path.”