"Operation Cast Lead was the most planned operation in the annals of Israel's wars," Aluf Benn wrote in these pages over the weekend ("The noose tightens," October 16). Heaven help us for such planning, which was technically sophisticated yet one-dimensional.

The responsibility for the failure does not rest on the Israel Defense Forces, whose job is not to analyze issues from a diplomatic perspective. The difference between military planning, no matter how brilliant, and diplomatic thinking is perfectly encapsulated in the classic work by German historian Gerhard Ritter, "The Sword and the Scepter."

The original German title of the book, "Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk," can be translated as "the art of statecraft and the craft of war." The IDF is responsible for the craft of war, and the quality of that craft is of utmost importance to Israel's future. It must focus on military planning.

The art of statecraft, however, bears fateful consequences, so those in charge of statecraft must exercise control over military planning, issue directives to the army and supervise it.

Diplomatic thinking needs to be multidimensional. It must balance the need to deal a decisive blow to the enemy and the need to avoid damage to Israel's image that greatly exceeds the benefit of unleashing the blows. Operation Cast Lead did not meet this minimum demand.

It has once again become clear that key recommendations by the Winograd Committee that investigated the Second Lebanon War were not implemented. An important lesson from that war was the necessity of a diplomatic-security perspective in which the Foreign Ministry was a full partner to defense-related decisions and military calculations.

On this issue, two questions are worth considering: Was the Foreign Ministry asked to examine the plans for Cast Lead through a diplomatic perspective that would also take into account Israel's image in the world? If so, did the Foreign Ministry foresee the reasonable possibility that a committee similar to the Goldstone Commission would be formed if the ratio between Palestinian and Israeli casualties appeared "unreasonable"? If the Foreign Ministry was not consulted on these issues, the prime minister was responsible. If the Foreign Ministry was consulted but did not emphasize concerns that Israel's image would be harmed by the Palestinians' mounting casualties, it must bear the blame.

From the diplomatic perspective, image considerations are not necessarily a decisive factor. Gains are possible where it is worthwhile for Israel to absorb major blows to its image, if there is no other way. This was certainly not the case in Cast Lead. If the defense minister's recommendation to halt the offensive after three days had been accepted, Israel would have achieved deterrence against rocket fire in the south without the many Palestinian deaths and horrific destruction.

Alternately, there was a chance to conquer most of Gaza while destroying Hamas' forces and transferring power to the Palestinian Authority. Such a viable, clear achievement would have been a worthy price for the damage done to Israel's image. Furthermore, it would have constituted a necessary, clear-cut victory from the perspective of the PA and moderate Arab states, because it would have greatly eased the damage to Israel's image. Indeed, the world is accustomed to forgiving "the sins" of those who achieve clear victory. Israel, however, did not demonstrably break "the resistance forces," nor did it change Hamas rule in Gaza.

There is no escaping the painful and infuriating conclusion that Cast Lead was a repetition of the most serious error committed during the Second Lebanon War and highlighted by the Winograd Committee: "Treading water." Israel did not halt the operation after a few days or move on to the next stage, which called for occupying the bulk of Gaza. The result was a limited achievement at a high cost. In other words, a net loss.

I don't know if this is the appropriate step from a public relations standpoint, which is the most important factor in determining whether to establish a commission of inquiry. But no doubt urgent action must be taken to subjugate the craft of war - given all its importance and the high esteem we award those responsible for its execution - to the art of statecraft. The responsibility rests with the prime minister and defense minister, who are aided by the National Security Council.