Bickering within Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has come to the fore as never before. The divisions in the movement and their dubious relationship with Hamas have posed serious questions about the scope, if any, this movement is penetrated by Hamas.

Khaled Mishaal pledged that Hamas would not interfere in Jordan’s internal politics. This statement is outrageous, to say the least. First, Mishaal sends a clear message that he and his group are a force to be reckoned with and hence Jordan should rethink its relations with Hamas. Implicit in Mishaal’s statement is that he could act to destabilise Jordan.

On both grounds, Jordan’s national security could be compromised. More importantly, Mishaal is being used by Damascus, which has been trying to line up Arab support for its foreign policy. It is the rule of the thumb in Middle East regional politics that when a state funds or hosts a non-state actor, it is not cost-free. In the end, states use their resources to further their national agendas and this is not done as charity.

The questions, therefore, that Jordanians should be asking are: What will happen if Mishaal dominates Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood? Will he keep his pledge in case Damascus asks or orders him to use the movement to pressure the regime? Can Jordan really rely on Mishaal’s gestures and “good intention”?

Many experts argue that the first arena that Jordan should focus on is the Muslim Brotherhood. How the internal differences will unfold between the Transjordanian trend and the more powerful Hamas remains to be seen. How will the resolution (or otherwise) of these differences impact the Jordan-Hamas relationship and will rapprochement between Hamas and Jordan be facilitated?

Obviously, the rift between Hamas and Jordan has little to do with their different positions on peace and more with how Hamas manages its relations with Jordan or uses its cards in the country. Jordan is hypersensitive about this issue, given its bitter experience with Palestinian factions using Jordan as an arena. Many would point to the chaos these factions created in Jordan in late 1960s and how they triggered a showdown with the regime in 1970.

Sources from within the Muslim Brotherhood assert that Mishaal is part of the problem. They claim that he interferes in different ways and for this reason he cannot be an honest broker between the contending parties in the Muslim Brotherhood. Mishaal wants 25 per cent of the seats of the movement’s Consultative Council allocated to members of the movement who reside in the Gulf. Given the Palestinian identity of the members in the Muslim Brotherhood who reside in the Gulf, it does not take a genius to understand that Hamas will have a decisive say on matters and this will assure Hamas’ domination over the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hamas’ offence will not be without cost for Jordan. For instance, if Hamas succeeds in dominating the Muslim Brotherhood, its credibility among Transjordanians will be undermined. Many in Jordan make a distinction between supporting Hamas in its bid to lead the Palestinians to independence and liberation and Hamas’ ill-advised step to meddle in Jordan’s internal affairs.

Some are tempted to wonder why it appears that the state is not interested in interfering.

Ibrahim Gharaiba, a top Jordanian expert on Islam, argues that it was the Jordanian authorities who adopted a strategy to weaken this Transjordanian reformist trend because its agenda is one of democratic reforms, which is not one of Jordan’s top priorities.

While Gharaiba may be correct, the issue should be seen from the prism of national security and Jordan should look at the security implication of a possible Hamas takeover of the Muslim Brotherhood, and how Syria can use this as a card in its troubled relationship with Jordan. In other words, Jordan does itself a favour if it ceases looking at the wrangling within the Muslim Brotherhood as a power struggle and begins to see the wider implication of this internal upheaval.