The state of embarrassment and opportunism, and sometimes malice, that accompanied the military settlement carried out by Hamas against Jund Ansar Allah in the Gaza Strip, is not unique in the relationship between political Islam and the hard-line fundamentalist organizations it brought about under different names. We have seen such a case in Egypt when some fundamentalist organizations ignited armed violence in the face of the state and citizens. We also witnessed it in Algeria with the outbreak of hostile activities. Moreover, we have experienced fundamentalist terrorism in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries, the most recent of which being Nigeria.

The recent cases conceal this deliberate ambiguity between the so-called "preaching" and "Jihad", and the invisible lines between both labels. The theorists of political Islam intentionally expressed their (perhaps temporary) reservations on fundamentalist violence methods. But they did not dare attack the purposes of this violence on a daily basis. They also did not eliminate this fatal ambiguity between political action and its methodological justifications.

When it comes to the [Gaza] Strip, all of this has been coupled with the complications of the struggle with Israel and the conflict with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority as well as Hamas' security dominance over Gaza – thus increasing the embarrassment, malice, opportunism, and political manipulation. This does not only apply to Hamas alone, but also to its Palestinian rivals, particularly in Fatah and the [Palestinian] Authority. As such, the references of power mingled in a hypocritical manner with the phenomenon of "Jihadist Salafism" and the outcome of the military settlement against Jund Ansar Allah, due to the embarrassment this phenomenon represents for Hamas – whose reference is the Muslim Brotherhood Movement - and to the opportunism of Fatah – which has a pluralistic reference – for the purpose of exploiting it in the political battle between the two parties.

Hamas spokesmen justify their excessive use of violence against the group of Sheikh Abdul Latif Moussa by saying that this group has violated the laws, as though the matter were confined to a criminal act. They did not probe the reasons behind the emergence of this phenomenon, which was formed alongside others under Hamas's political and military hegemony on the Strip, and the unilateral reference Hamas represents at the political and social levels. They also did not examine the ideological grounds and approach that prompted Sheikh Moussa to move from the "preaching" activities – when he was in the ranks of Hamas – to pursue "jihadist" activities later on, when his ambition became to form an "Islamic Emirate" in Rafah. All what they saw about the phenomenon was the violation of laws that were – incidentally – those Hamas enforced through its ousted government, and the violation of the "constants" in resisting Israel at a time when the movement abides by cease-fire with the occupier.

As for linking Sheikh Moussa's group to leaders in Fatah or the Palestinian Authority, it aims at covering [Hamas'] resorting to excessive violence in facing a possible rival. Hamas feels that the presence of extremist fundamentalist groups – which will necessarily compete with Hamas over power and work mechanism – will pose a threat to its hegemony and influence. Thus, it accused this group of being tasked with destabilizing the civil peace in the Strip as it sees it. This group has been also accused of fulfilling Fatah's scheme and that of Israel as some said, in order to strike Hamas, which only acted in self-defense.

On the other hand, Fatah leaders did not hesitate to launch a campaign against Hamas accusing it of opposing pluralism and resorting to violence to prevent it. They also accused it of being indifferent to the souls of Palestinian citizens and sanctity of mosques. Let us put aside the heavy and unconvincing tears over those who died during the decisive operation, and ask about the pluralism Sheikh Moussa had introduced to the Palestinian political scene, and the repudiation of violence and use of weapons which has almost become the only means used on the Palestinian domestic arena. Let us also ask about the reasons that created this level of tension and frustration of the Palestinian youths who are only enticed – thanks to multiple disappointments – by the language of extremism and radicalism. Fatah and Hamas both take part in generating these reasons.

Sheikh Moussa's page was turned with his death, but there is no guarantee that the phenomenon will not be renewed, perhaps with even more intensity and violence. We will not spare the Palestinian situation this additional catastrophe unless we ponder its motives and causes and are brave enough to call things by their names and draw lessons.