Hamas has eliminated the Islamic emirate announced by Abdel Latif Moussa (Abou Nour Makdessi) in Rafah. It has eliminated the emirate and its prince. Hamas cannot stand Moussa’s accusations. He said that if the Hamas government maintained its status, it would be like a secular party “fraudulently associating itself with Islam like (Turkish Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan”. It is not easy for Hamas to see the “Prince of the Jihadi Salafists” stand in a mosque and challenge its image and approach then call his armed men to the street, challenging its authority and status. The mosque and the street represent the backbone of Hamas’ force and authority in the Gaza Strip.

The use of Erdogan to attack Hamas reminded me of what Ankara’s visitor hears about the necessity of the participation of the “vital force” or the “new force” in the search for peace and stability in the region. What is meant by this is opening the door of dialogue with these forces, listening to them, and allowing them to mature through dialogue. In other words, this implies encouraging them to follow realistic policies that make them regionally and internationally accepted. Those who have this opinion consider that isolating these Islamic forces, which have a representative function in their societies, will lead them to even more extremism, and make part of their supporters ready to represent extremist and destructive stances that are close to Al Qaeda’s approach. It is obvious that Hamas is among the forces that should participate and mature.

After its control over it, Hamas rejected any talk about the existence in the Gaza Strip of factions that are affiliated with Al Qaeda or close to it. Some Hamas leaders consider that the existence of the movement is a guarantee against Al Qaeda’s infiltration into the Palestinian ranks. They believe that the Hamas resistance represents a floodgate against Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri’s Palestinian ambitions.

The Hamas police have crushed the Jund Ansar Allah faction in an operation that resulted in tens of killed and hundreds of wounded. They accused it of being “takfiri”, of seeking to weaken Hamas and the Palestinian people, and of not resisting occupation and refusing to participate in defending Gaza.

It was difficult for Hamas to be lenient with a phenomenon that could lead to the erosion of its authority in the Gaza Strip and turn it into an accused at the tribunes of some mosques. What made the situation even more delicate is that the events came at a time when the Fatah conference was successfully held, relations were restored among the Fatah clusters, and the legitimacy of Mahmoud Abbas as Yasser Arafat’s heir was renewed.

The recent events highlight the difficulties Hamas is going through despite wide public acclaim and its previous victory in the legislative elections, as well as what it offered during Israel’s barbaric war on Gaza. The UN Security Resolution 1860 that put an end to the Israeli aggression constitutes a heavy constraint for Hamas that is similar to the one set for Hezbollah by Resolution 1701, despite the dissimilarities between the Gaza and the July wars, and the different arenas and circumstances. Hamas stood its ground in Gaza but lost in the end the ability to move the front with the enemy, as moving implies risking a new war. Hezbollah realized a military achievement but lost the ability to move the front without risking a wide-ranging war.

Hamas discovered that its allies can be counted on the fingers of one hand. It discovered that there is a high price to pay for breaking isolation, reconstruction, making the Palestinian dialogue succeed, and resuming clashes with the enemy. It discovered that it has to change in order to be accepted, and that its relations in the Arab and Islamic world are shallower than it thought.

The card of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit is not enough anymore to help Ismail Haniya’s resigned government bear the burden of waiting. The great question that poses itself is what does Hamas do with Gaza, which it controls; does it want to resist or negotiate; what is the extent of its readiness to pay the prices of each of the two options? As for the option of open waiting, it heralds events similar to repressing the emirate, knowing that the cost of returning under the cloak of Abbas seems to be less than that of the other options.