Nearly two years ago, Jordan opened its doors to the attempt by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to restore and awaken the Fatah movement. Fatah is the backbone of the Palestinian national movement and the main Palestinian partner in the peace process to which Jordan attaches special attention. The rise of the Hamas movement and its landslide victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections played a major role in encouraging Jordan to move away from its usual caution and provide all possible facilities for holding the Fatah congress and rebuilding the movement.

The prevailing belief among the Palestinian leadership since 2006 holds that only Fatah can confront the rise of radical Islamic movements in Palestine and provide the “moderate Palestinian alternative” that believes in the peace process and the two-state solution. Jordan perceives a vital interest in this matter, for two reasons. First, Jordan itself faces a powerful Islamist movement strongly supportive of Hamas and to a large extent strengthened by the rise of Hamas. Second, Jordan believes that the establishment of a viable Palestinian state is an expression of its principal national interest in the face of what it believes to be plans for resolving the issue of Palestine at its expense and against its interests.

That’s why before the Sixth Fatah Congress last week, instructions were issued by the highest political authorities in Jordan to facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee. Abbas, who also heads the Fatah movement, was offered the opportunity to meet tens of leading Fatah personalities whom Jordan had banned for decades. Amman became the permanent headquarters for meetings of the Fatah Central Committee and the Preparatory Committee for the congress.

As an expression of support for Abbas and for what and whom he represents, King Abdullah II took the initiative to attend some of the Fatah Central Committee meetings in Amman. This signified that Jordan stood firmly on the side of the Palestinian line of moderation and Palestinian legitimacy as represented by Abbas in his quest to build an independent Palestinian state and in the face of what was regarded in Amman as winds of extremism and fundamentalism that could threaten the peace process.

This significant support to the Fatah movement coincides with Fatah’s efforts to restore its unity and leading historic role. It has also reflected a deterioration in Jordan’s relations with Hamas.

Jordan’s position regarding the internal Palestinian conflict and its two main factions has been influenced by many factors, of which several are particularly important. For one, Jordan looks at the conflict between Fatah and Hamas as part of the larger clash between the camps of “moderation” and “resistance” in the region.

Then too, Jordanian fears have been based on the rise of the Islamic movement in Jordan, which felt strong due to Hamas’ sweeping victory in the Palestinian elections, to the extent that some Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Jordan began talking about a similar readiness for the movement to form a government in Jordan in the event of its victory in democratic elections. Finally, Jordan is keen to speed up the peace process and to close the Palestinian file.

More than three years have passed since Hamas’ victory in elections and the formation of its government in Gaza. For a time, Jordan feared that its reliance on the awakening, development and strengthening of the Fatah movement was exaggerated insofar as neither isolation nor sanctions – and consequently war – succeeded in toppling the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Jordan had doubts about the status of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, amid reports that what prevented a repetition of the Gaza experience in the West Bank was the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas, not PA security forces.

This caused Jordanian diplomacy to back away a little from relations with Fatah and cautiously advance in its relations with Hamas. Jordan kept its distance from the Fatah-Hamas conflict as well as Fatah’s own endless internal conflicts and opened a secure communications line with Hamas.

When Farouk Qaddumi, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Political Department and secretary general of Fatah, dropped the bombshell accusation that Abbas and his adviser Mohammad Dahlan had plotted with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz to assassinate Yasser Arafat, Jordan tried to steer clear of the controversy, and was keen that these statements made in Amman not be interpreted as a change in Jordan’s stance or a sign of support for Qaddumi against Abbas.

The Jordanian government also stressed that while it did not ask Qaddumi to leave Jordan, it requested that he not issue statements that would embarrass the government or tarnish its image of support for the Palestinian people in general. Jordan has never maintained good relations with Qaddumi; on the contrary, the veteran Palestinian diplomat has often clashed politically and diplomatically with Jordanian foreign ministers in Arab inter-governmental and regional meetings.

Amman hopes the Fatah Congress in Bethlehem will ultimately help Fatah’s unity and enhance its role in the moderate Palestinian camp, although the results last week were not encouraging. Jordan does not pin much hope on Fatah’s regaining leadership of the Palestinians. The experience of the past few years has demonstrated that Fatah’s leadership of the Palestinian national movement is in regression. Day by day it is turning into a functional body of the PA, suffering from the same ailments.