His meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington next month will be a formative event in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political career. Its outcome will determine whether Netanyahu's impressive comeback a decade after he left the prime ministership will lead him once again into disputes and confrontations with the U.S. administration, as happened in his first term, or whether the old-new Netanyahu will become a desired and welcome guest in the White House.

The prime minister is aware of the assumption of many that his rejection of the idea of a Palestinian state, and opposition to withdrawals from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, will result in an inevitable crisis in relations with Obama and propel Israel into political isolation. But he is not afraid. The way he sees it, it's better to come to the White House with a list of demands and requests, and to condition any concession on a quid pro quo, than it is to play the role of yes man to the president and gain nothing in return.

Ehud Olmert emerged from his many talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with the impression that, because of the Palestinians' positions on the so-called core issues, there is no chance for a final-status accord with them - which is why he opted to emphasize Israeli generosity to secure international support. Netanyahu prefers to enter into negotiations with maximalist positions rather than to begin with concessions that may win the world's approval but won't satisfy the other side. He is ready to pay the political price this will exact abroad for the sake of appearing consistent in his positions and preserving his coalition at home. With the Washington trip on the horizon, Netanyahu has filled the international media with hints that Israel is ready to launch a preemptive strike against Iran, and with the demands that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people, something he said would be a precondition for Israeli recognition of a future state. Obama replied to these messages with a call for goodwill gestures and confidence-building measures, and with a reminder of the commitments made by Netanyahu's predecessors - i.e., a freeze on settlement construction, the evacuation of outposts and the removal of checkpoints in the West Bank.

'Itamar for Natanz'

Translated from diplomatic-speak, it means something like this: Netanyahu threatens to disrupt Obama's "new order" in the region, if he sends the air force to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities; Obama threatens to undermine Netanyahu's coalition, if he demands that the Israeli rein in the settlers. This equation, "Itamar [the West Bank settlement] for Natanz," was posed before, during the Olmert-Bush era, but both leaders were too weak to make the threats credible it - Bush because of Iraq and Olmert because of Lebanon. Their successors currently enjoy a burst of political strength, at this early point in their tenure, and so the "mutually assured destruction" equation relevant once again.

Despite their different approaches, Netanyahu is encouraged by Obama's realism, and it gives him hope that they will be able to develop a cooperative and understanding work relationship. The prime minister admires the president's knack for leadership and his well-honed political instincts. He was especially impressed by Obama's interest in Israel's coalition politics, in their phone conversation following the swearing-in of the 18th Knesset, and by his desire to understand all of Netanyahu's considerations. The prime minister construed this as understanding on Obama's part for the political constraints faced by a fellow leader, and as a hint that the president will not try to impose on him moves that would be too difficult to digest.

Still the same bad guys

This week, Netanyahu was buoyed by an article by Washington Post columnist Jackson Diehl that described Obama's exposure to the real world. Every new president, Diehl wrote, likes to blame the world's problems on his predecessor's failed policies. But after about 100 days in office, Obama is learning that extremist states and terror organizations exist in their own right, and are not merely a reaction to Bush's problematic positions.

North Korea is playing with Obama - just as it did his predecessor - while Russia and Iran are ignoring the new president's friendly gestures and continuing with their aggressive measures. Netanyahu is probably looking forward to meeting Obama at a time when the president has left the campaign slogans behind, gotten a taste of actual statesmanship and come to realize that the bad guys are still the same bad guys, regardless of who's in power in Washington.

But the cards that these leaders hold in their hands are much more important in the diplomatic poker game, and none is more important than political support. The positions Netanyahu has outlined since his return to power need to be viewed in this light. He knows the Democratic-controlled Congress will back Obama's peace overtures in the Middle East and that Israel will not be able to outflank the president via Capitol Hill if it is perceived there as being contrary and unyielding. But members of Congress will also insist that America meet its commitments to Israel's security. Netanyahu wants to come to Washington with the broadest possible support back home, so as to prevent the Americans from doing anything that might destabilize his government.

This is why Netanyahu's demands are for the most part reflective of the consensus: saving Israel from the nuclear holocaust Iran is plotting, and having the Palestinians recognize Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. On these matters, there is no opposition in Israel, apart from in the Arab parties, and it will be much easier for members of Congress to back Netanyahu on such issues. It's easy to see why the prime minister is downplaying his positions on settlement construction, for instance, telling anyone who asks that the subject is under discussion. He knows he'll have trouble securing Congressional support for any decision to go ahead with new construction in the territories.

Netanyahu is assuring people that the expectation that he'll have terrible relations with Obama will be disappointed. To realize his ideal scenario, he'll have to do more than present the president with a list of demands. He'll have to give him something in return, too - some verbal gesture in the direction of the Palestinians and the Arab initiative, or some kind of concrete step in the field. But that's not something Netanyahu is about to reveal now, for fear he will be pressed to make further concessions ahead of the visit. We'll have to wait for the decisions he makes after a "reassessment" of Israel's peace policy.