If there was any hope for negotiations between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo to reach an agreement that would end the state of division between the Palestinians, such a hope has become less likely today as a result of the repercussions of the exchange of smear campaigns between the Egyptian government and Hezbollah, on the background of the cell arrested by the Egyptians, who claim that it had been planning activities that pose a threat to Egypt's security.

Indeed, despite setting a date for the third round of Palestinian dialogue before the end of this month, developments in the region have come to represent such pressure on the two Palestinian parties negotiating that it is no longer possible to look into the disagreement between the Palestinians regardless of what is happening in the region. And while Egypt considers that the activities Hezbollah, and behind it Iran and perhaps other governments in the region, is engaging in on its soil to be unacceptable interference into Egypt's internal affairs, the Islamic movement that controls the Gaza Strip will certainly find itself in an extremely awkward position if it chooses to continue negotiating with Fatah, as Cairo invites it to by virtue of its role as mediator between the two sides. Indeed, Hamas's ideology is not far from that which Hezbollah actively defends, nor is Hamas far from the sources of funding and armament that supply the party.

And if this required any evidence, it came through Hezbollah's Egyptian cell, as the party's Secretary-General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, did not deny that it worked on transporting equipment and individuals to Gaza, although he did deny the other accusations, those related to posing a threat to Egypt's internal security. Indeed, in light of the smear campaigns between Cairo and Hezbollah, it has become difficult to imagine how it will be possible for Hamas to approve of the role played by Minister Omar Suleiman to resolve the inter-Palestinian disagreement, to accept him as a neutral third party and thus to commit to the results of the Egyptian mediation.

Cairo, for its part, will doubtless be forced, even if on the basis of ensuring its internal security - which it now considers threatened from a side whose identity has become known and public, to ask Hamas the difficult questions, those related to its partnership with Hezbollah, to the level of security and logistical coordination between them, and to the extent to which this affects the internal situation in Egypt as well as the activities and movements of some opposition groups there, groups that are publicly involved, at the political, ideological and security levels, with the government that controls Gaza.

We are thus faced with a situation in which security concerns in Egypt have become more important than seeking to play a regional role which would be strengthened by success in mediating between the Palestinians. Additionally, the Palestinians themselves are in no hurry to reach an agreement, with or without Egyptian mediation.

Indeed, the ruling right-wing ideology in Israel allows for a relief period for all sides, based on the fact that the fundamental choices regarding plans for a settlement or disagreement over "respecting" previous agreements or "committing" to them, not to mention the program of the national unity government. All of these issues have today been postponed, "thanks" to Benjamin Netanyahu, and this grants all parties the opportunity to reexamine their stances and build on them, and to devote themselves to resolving their internal concerns, whether they are political or pertaining to security. This applies to Egypt as much as it does to both Fatah and Hamas.