The second round of Palestinian reconciliation talks in Cairo have been postponed for several weeks, and even if they resume toward the end of April as announced, it is not likely that they will succeed. At best the parties might agree on the composition of the new Cabinet, but all other issues, even if there is agreement in principle over them, will not be implemented any time soon.

Three out of five issues on the table are the most difficult: the formation of a new Cabinet, the integration of the various security services, and the reform of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to make it possible for Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to join. Not only do internal factors work against any possible rapprochement, but external factors do as well that may be even more compelling.

Even though the need to rebuild what was destroyed in the Israeli war against Gaza is pressing, which no doubt puts pressure on Hamas, still the movement appears to believe that it need not make the concessions necessary for a new Cabinet to be formed. Hamas went as far as agreeing to "respect" previous agreements, but refused clearer language of the type Fatah insisted on, such as to "accept and abide by" them (iltizam, in Arabic), which the Quartet is demanding and which is necessary to lift the Israeli economic and political siege on a future Palestinian government.

The reason for this is that Hamas does not perceive itself as having lost in the Gaza war, despite of the tremendous price the Palestinians paid. The movement is still in control of the territory and assumes that realpolitik will ultimately prevail. An additional factor is the uncertain regional policies of the Obama administration. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have altered their classification of "terrorist organizations," so that Washington has discovered there is a "moderate" wing to the Taliban that can be negotiated with, while the UK discovered a "political" wing to Hizbullah. Hamas, too, has a political wing, as well as "moderates," waiting to be discovered. Hamas' behavior may be brinkmanship, so that as time goes by and the Israeli siege continues, the movement will be under greater pressure to do something to lift it. Hence the possibility of another conflagration in due course, especially since the new Israeli government is unlikely to be conciliatory toward Hamas.

The integration of the security services will not be possible in the West Bank given that their task there is to arrest Hamas activists under the security regime now being overseen by General Keith Dayton. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been for the past year and a half seeking to fulfill its role in accordance with Stage 1 of the "road map," which calls for the PA to undertake visible efforts to secure the security of Israel. This program will be undone if the Hamas and PA security services are integrated in the West Bank, and no doubt Hamas will condition the integration on the relinquishment of this program. The PA will not be able to carry through any such integration given its present commitments and the hope it retains for political progress under the Obama administration.

Reform of the PLO raises both internal and external issues. It is well understood that any reform of the organization, including elections for a new Executive Committee to replace the aging one whose numbers have gradually dwindled as a result of death and retirement, will do away with almost all present members who are still holding on to their positions. A new balance of power will emerge, and Hamas' share will become a matter of contention. How does one apportion seats if elections are not possible everywhere where Palestinians reside? At least half of the Palestinians live outside Palestine and since the PLO represents all Palestinians, its representatives will claim to have majority support in the countries of the diaspora.

The PA also understands that if Hamas joins the PLO, the organization itself may be subject to sanctions by the US Congress, where Israel has considerable influence. From the PA's perspective, therefore, there is no reason to rush reconciliation efforts, especially if Hamas is seen as attempting to replace Fatah as the representative of most Palestinians. The reconciliation talks in Cairo are also a battle over who represents Palestinians.

The dilemma the PA faces is that it has very few years left in its life. This is a last-ditch battle. If there is no credible political progress that the PA can show to the Palestinians after 17 years of negotiations since the Madrid conference, what credibility it has left will be lost. The PA does not have 17 more years to negotiate. Its life is really tied to what the Obama administration will do. It has one to three years at most. Otherwise, Hamas will take over.