No one knows exactly what will happen on November 4th when Americans vote for a new president, but all signs suggest that Senator Barack Obama will win the election. He is competing in several traditionally Republican states like Virginia and North Carolina and only needs to win one out of a number of swing states to secure victory. The Obama campaign has benefited from record-breaking fundraising and is reported to be outspending the McCain campaign on advertising by more than four times in Florida alone. While it is premature to declare Obama the next president, it is important to assess how an Obama administration would likely change America's role in the Middle East, particularly if states in the region want to ensure an active and productive relationship with the next president.

Today, the United States appears very weak in the Middle East. Iran continues its march toward obtaining nuclear weapons, Palestinian-Israeli peace remains elusive, the Iraqi government has still not reached a States of Forces Agreement with the U.S. that will allow American troops to continue operating in the country after the end of the year, and Lebanon's March 14th movement will likely lose it parliamentary majority in the spring. The democracy agenda promoted by President Bush in his second inaugural address lies dormant. In fact, there is little evidence that any policies pursued by the Bush administration will have a lasting positive impact in the Middle East unless political leaders in Iraq begin to pursue national rather than factional goals.

One of the principal reasons behind the failure of the Bush administration in the region has been the with-us-or-against-us diplomacy it adopted after September 11th. The Bush team pursued diplomacy in black and white while Arabs operate in shades of gray. These are two fundamentally different styles of foreign policy that have not blended well over the past eight years. For example, after the 2006 Lebanon War broke out, Secretary Rice sought to exploit a "strategic realignment" in the region and to draw a line in the desert. On one side would be Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon's Seniora government, and Abu Mazen's faltering Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. On the other side would be Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas in Gaza. It was never clear exactly what Rice sought to accomplish with this distinction. Certainly she did not plan for the Saudis to host Ahmedinejad and broker the Mecca Agreement between Hamas and Fatah, which the Egyptians are currently attempting to revitalize. Rice was also absent when the Qataris ended the stalemate among Lebanese factions. This habit of accommodation and deal-making did not reflect a "strategic realignment."

Judging by Senator Obama's words and those of his key national security advisors, an Obama administration would initiate a new type of diplomacy in the Middle East based on partnership rather than demands. In 2007, Obama wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine, "To renew American leadership in the world, I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security. Needed reform of these alliances and institutions will not come by bullying other countries to ratify changes we hatch in isolation. It will come when we convince other governments and peoples that they, too, have a stake in effective partnerships."

Similarly, a group of Democratic foreign policy experts, many of whom advise Obama, wrote in a June 2008 report: "On many issues, however, the United States must be pragmatic and flexible enough to work with a wide variety of states on different issues… And while being clear on its own red lines, Washington should be willing to adapt is positions to gain the consensus ultimately needed for effective policy making and implementation." Translation: the U.S. will likely undertake new diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program including engaging in direct talks with Tehran. It will seek to broker a Syrian-Israel peace as part of a broader effort to normalize relations with Syria and move it away from Iran's influence. Resuscitating the Palestinian-Israeli peace process will also receive attention. Because of the urgency of the nuclear issue and the progress it has made enriching uranium, Iran will likely top an Obama agenda in the Middle East. Engagement will likely be accompanied by an effort to gain regional support for a harsher basket of sanctions should Iran reject efforts to get it to abandon the nuclear fuel cycle.

However, the Obama agenda will be crowded and the new administration will be saddled with the international financial crisis, troubles in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a global effort to curb climate change. If Arab states really want to see a new direction in U.S. policy toward the region, they should not just sit and wait for an American initiative. Rather, Arab states can make engagement more fruitful if they take some proactive steps that signal they will be productive partners for advancing peace and security. For example, American engagement with Iran would be strengthened if it occurred in the context of a Gulf-initiated effort to curb the investments that their key trading partners like China and India have in Iran. Similarly, relaunching the Arab peace initiative in a way that signals a genuine preparedness to normalize relations with Israel would improve the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli peace. Conversely, Arab-led efforts to restore Palestinian unity in a way that allows Hamas to continue as an armed group dedicated to Israel's elimination will make the next administration less inclined to invest heavily in the peace process.

The end of the Bush years represents a tremendous opportunity to restore balance and partnership to U.S.-Arab relations. Realizing that opportunity, however, will require not just a new attitude toward foreign policy in Washington but reinvigorated and productive diplomacy from Riyadh to Rabat.