After close to two weeks of unchecked inundation into Rafah by an estimated 700,000 of the 1.5 million inhabitants of Gaza, quiet once again reigns after Egyptian troops have closed the border. But for how long the calm will prevail and how long the border will be sealed is still undetermined. Because of the continuing Israeli siege of Gaza, another breach is bound to occur sooner or later.

US and Israeli officials have been demanding that Egypt simply seal its borders and leave Gaza to its fate. Egypt has refused such orders but, at the same time, it has become practically impossible for Cairo to continue with the closed-crossing policy that it previously adopted. In order for Egypt to secure a prompt and legal operation of the borders, it would need either to secure the consent of Hamas for the reinstatement of the border agreement suspended when Hamas took control of Gaza or to introduce a new agreement acceptable to both sides and to Israel and the international community. Either scenario, however, would require a Hamas-Fatah agreement, if not full reconciliation. In view of his inability to weaken Hamas, President Mahmoud Abbas needs to learn how at least to live with Hamas. Abbas, who has shown much tolerance toward Israeli leaders who kill and maim Palestinians with impunity, needs to exercise some tolerance with his domestic political rival as well. The least Abbas can do is to talk directly or indirectly to Hamas on ways to manage daily concerns, the Rafah crossing point being first on the agenda.

To be sure, Hamas is not wholly against the deployment of PA security personnel at the crossings. The movement would like to see such a step, but taken as part of an overall package that would somehow allow for Hamas participation in an elementary control of the crossing point. But Abbas does not seem sufficiently independent to reach an agreement with Hamas, since such reconciliation, even if it remained tacit, would upset and perhaps alienate his bankrollers and political backers, especially in the West which makes no secret of its wish to isolate and eventually ostracize Hamas. It would also give Israel the pretext to disengage from peace talks with the Palestinians, despite the disingenuousness of the negotiations, as evident from the dismal outcome of numerous meetings between Prime Minister Olmert and Abbas.

A Fatah-Hamas stalemate on Rafah puts added pressure on Egypt which is being looked to by Hamas to prevent the further collapse of the Gazan economy. Hamas wants to end Gaza’s economic ties with Israel and for Egypt to step in instead. Egypt was in administrative control of Gaza in both 1948-1956 and 1957-1967. It also signals a willingness on the part of Hamas to accept Egyptian patronage as a means of staying afloat amidst Israeli, US and even Abbas-backed pressure. Israel would also welcome such a setup but only because a permanent separation of Gaza and the West Bank is part of Israel’s strategic agenda to render a viable Palestinian state impossible.