n the wake of last month's Annapolis conference, some quarters of Arab officialdom express optimism that the talks might yet lead to a settlement of the perennial Israel-Palestine conflict. Many independent analysts, however, saw the event as little more than an exercise in submission.

"Annapolis was proof of total Arab failure," Gamal Zahran, political science professor at the Suez Canal University and independent parliamentarian, told IPS. "It confirmed the ability of the Zionist U.S. administration to force its will on Arab capitals."

The conference was initially proposed in July by U.S. President George W. Bush with the ostensible aim of restarting "serious negotiations towards the creation of a Palestinian state." Held in the U.S. coastal city of Annapolis, Maryland, on Nov. 27, the event brought together representatives from Israel, the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA) and 16 Arab nations.

The most tangible result of the conference was an agreement between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PA President Mahmoud Abbas to hold a series of meetings with the stated objective of reaching a final settlement. However, the planned talks -- scheduled to begin on Dec. 12 -- will most likely defer final status issues to a later, unspecified date.

The only reference to a timetable for implementation came in a closing statement, in which participants vowed to "make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008."

While Abbas received promises from his Israeli interlocutors that conditions would be eased in the PA-controlled West Bank, these came within the context of stringent provisions guaranteeing Israel's security. Olmert also reserved Israel's right to maintain its policy of assassination against Palestinian resistance activists and to launch military incursions in areas governed by the PA.

Abbas, for his part, vowed that the PA would endeavour to combat acts of "terrorism" against Israel -- an obvious reference to Palestinian resistance faction Hamas. Hamas, which has governed the Gaza Strip since wresting it from PA control in June, was not invited to the conference.

The outcome of Annapolis essentially represents a return to the U.S.-sponsored "roadmap" peace plan as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The initiative, first tabled in 2003, stipulates that Israeli security conditions be met before any final status negotiations are held.

Longstanding Arab demands, meanwhile, were conspicuously absent at Annapolis. These demands -- which form the pillars of the 2002 Saudi-backed Arab Initiative -- include Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, a "just solution" to the issue of Palestinian refugees, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The conference also failed to address the dire humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip -- the result of an economic embargo backed by the U.S. and Israel -- and the longstanding demand for a freeze on Israeli settlement building in occupied territories.

According to Arab critics, the parameters of the conference were stacked in Israel's favour from the outset.

"Final status issues weren't even on the agenda," said Zahran. "There were no negotiations because there was nothing to negotiate. Arab representatives did little else besides follow diplomatic protocols."

Mohamed Basyouni, former Egyptian ambassador to Israel and head of the Shura Council's committee for Arab affairs, agreed that final status issues were treated only "vaguely" and "without reference to specific timetables."

Like other quarters of Arab officialdom, however, he expressed guarded optimism that the Olmert-Abbas talks activated at Annapolis could -- under the right circumstances -- eventually lead to a final settlement.

"Annapolis was only intended to restart the peace process," Basyouni told IPS. "We won't know if the event was a success or failure until we see the results of upcoming negotiations."

Notably, the conference was attended by several Arab states that have until now officially withheld recognition of Israel. These included regional heavyweights Saudi Arabia and Syria, both of which have traditionally refused to acknowledge the Hebrew state in the absence of an "equitable" settlement of the conflict.

Of the Arab League's 22 member states, only Egypt and Jordan currently have full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.

At the 2002 Arab summit in Beirut, Israel was offered across-the-board Arab recognition in exchange for core demands on the Palestine issue. Tel Aviv, however, has consistently rejected the peace offer, which was re-tabled most recently at the March Arab summit in Riyadh.

According to Zahran, Arab participation at Annapolis represented an inexcusable misuse of the normalisation card, considered the last remaining means available to Arab governments of exerting pressure on Israel.

"Israel succeeded in neutralising the historical Arab refusal to normalise relations," he said. "And the Arab side got nothing in return."

"This dismal showing further diminishes the popular standing of the Arab regimes," added Zahran. "Meanwhile, opposition groups in the region -- not least Hamas -- have been vindicated."

Basyouni, however, argued that Arab representation at Annapolis was not tantamount to diplomatic recognition of Israel.

"The conference didn't mean normalisation of relations by the Arab states," he said. "The 2002 Arab peace initiative clearly makes normalisation contingent upon arrival at a final settlement."

Nevertheless, Basyouni conceded that, should the Olmert-Abbas talks fail to deliver results, "Hamas will come out the winner."

Critics also note that the event was marked by repeated U.S. acknowledgement of Israel's status as a "Jewish state". According to some observers, the application of this term threatens the right of Palestinian refugees to return to what is now Israel, and leaves the door open for the potential expulsion of Israel's Arab inhabitants.

"The term refers to a state exclusive to Jewish citizens," said Zahran. "Its strict application would require that Israel's non-Jewish -- i.e., Arab -- citizens be expelled.

"While ominous, this isn't a new development," he added, pointing to a 2004 concordat between Bush and former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon that specifically confirmed Washington's commitment to Israel as a "Jewish state".

Basyouni, for his part, played down the importance of the designation in real terms.

"Bush and Olmert can use whatever phrases they want," he said. "In any case, we reject this term because it negates the historical Palestinian right of return and at least suggests the possibility of the expulsion of Arab citizens from Israel."

Ultimately, said Zahran, the Annapolis summit represented an unprecedented blow -- not only to the longstanding Palestinian cause, but for the wider community of Arab nations.

"We're in the darkest period in the history of the Arab-Zionist confrontation," he said. "We need new leadership, because the current regimes aren't able to deal competently with this never-ending conflict." (END/2007)