The only certainty at the outset of the Annapolis conference on Tuesday was that few predicted positive results.
 
The absence of optimism came, in part, from the almost total lack of substantial information released about the conference proceedings. This deficiency reached absurdity in a State Department briefing last week when journalists, deprived of basic details with which to formulate questions, quizzed spokesman Sean McCormack about how traffic in Washington might be affected by the conference, and on the font utilized on the conference invitation.  
 
The obsession over minor details stemmed from the absence of any real feeling that Annapolis would accomplish anything, as Daniel Levy, a fellow at the New America Foundation, put it.  Annapolis promised to be like the Seinfeld show, i.e., about nothing. In the end, however, it looks to have been the start of a process that could change the status quo and move the parties toward final status negotiations.  We won’t know right away.  It took a full 26-week season before Seinfeld started looking like it might be renewed.  It went on to become the most successful sitcom ever.  
 
In this case, as well, time will tell. 
 
In lieu of a clear-cut agreement, however, examining the details of the Annapolis event may illuminate the nature of the upcoming negotiation process.
 
The Guests
 
Over fifty international participants and observers were included at Annapolis. Notably, almost a third of them were representing Arab states, most of them foreign ministers.
 
Great energy was devoted to secure the attendance of the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who do not currently have diplomatic relations with Israel, have the prestige to enable other Arab states to become engaged with Israel.  Their participation in the process is considered to be crucial. It helps create an Arab consensus for the negotiation process, reopens the possibility of Arab-Israeli normalization, and draws a line between the two camps in the Middle East—those who support the peace process and those who do not. These camps fit the model that the Bush administration has been discussing throughout its tenure—“moderates,” such as the current government in the West Bank, and “extremist” states and their allies, such as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
 
Syria’s participation in the conference has been the most debated, anticipated, and promoted. Its involvement was only assured at the last minute—Syria hinged its attendance on the inclusion of the Golan Heights on the conference agenda—and only at the level of the deputy foreign minister (Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem, who did not participate in Annapolis, just concluded a trip to Tehran).  
 
For Israel, Syria’s inclusion is a step toward transforming its relationship with its north-east neighbor as well as within the region at large. A Syrian step away from Iran and toward Israel and the United States would weaken the “extremists” in the region. Some Israeli officials view a Syrian-Israeli peace as potentially more likely and less painful than an Israeli-Palestinian one. Some Israeli leaders, particularly with political aspirations, are more likely to push for Syrian-Israeli reconciliation in the near term. The fact is that Israeli prime ministers fearful of arousing the wrath of the West Bank settlers and the politicians who support them have often shifted their gaze to Damascus as the safer venue for negotiations (even though a successful deal with the Syrians would not help Israel on the more central Palestinian front.)
 
For the United States, Syrian attendance has no doubt been a sticky issue in light of the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Washington and Damascus, Syria’s alliance with Iran, its troublesome policies toward both Iraq and Lebanon, and its harboring of terrorist organizations. Its presence in Annapolis will not necessarily transform the U.S.-Syrian diplomatic relationship. (President Bush’s speech failed to mention Syria, but did mention Lebanon’s right to elect its president without “outside interference and intimidation,” a clear slight at Syria.) But the Syrian presence may indicate a U.S. willingness to go along with Israeli-Syrian negotiations should the Israelis choose to go ahead.
 
While Syrian and Saudi participation in Annapolis offers evidence of critical support for the peace process from two (former) rejectionist states, it by no means indicates that the support is lasting.

Syrian signals that they may be ready for a peace process neither guarantees a changed Syrian posture nor a separate Israeli-Syrian peace track. This was made clear when Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad said, following the Annapolis speeches, that normalization would only follow an Israeli return of the Golan Heights.

For his part, Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, went to great lengths to demonstrate his reticence to embrace Israel. Besides his refusal to shake hands, al-Faisal told reporters that Saudi-Israeli normalization would only be possible following a peace agreement with both the Palestinians and the Syrians.
 
The Uninvited
 
The broad Arab participation spotlighted a conspicuously absent party from the proceedings—Iran. For both Israel and the United States, the coalition of Arab states not only works toward normalizing Arab-Israeli relations but toward weakening Iran’s influence in the region.
 
Iran is still tied to both Syria and Hamas, however. Hamas, which condemned President Abbas as a “collaborator” for attending and promised increased violence against Israel, will likely increase its efforts to bring down both the peace process and the Abbas government.
 
The Statements

One of the major questions leading up to the conference was whether the Americans could successfully shepherd a joint Israeli-Palestinian declaration. Negotiations over the declaration continued passed the eleventh hour, when the United States reportedly urged Abbas to sign on. The struggle over the statement arose from disagreement over how specific the statement would be; namely, whether the core issues would be named and a timetable for final status negotiations would be set.
 
President Bush read the “Joint Understanding” at the outset of his speech. The statement, while generally cautious and vague, did state that negotiations should set out to resolve all core issues without exception. Furthermore, the statement expressed a hope for a final agreement before the end of 2008 (or the end of Bush’s term) and set the date of December 12 for the first meeting of a Palestinian-Israeli “steering committee” that will develop a working plan and oversee the negotiations.
 
The statement, while successfully delivered, has inspired fears among both Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians, already skeptical due to previously missed deadlines, worry that Abbas is returning home with a hazy promise that fails to set guaranteed deadlines for each requirement. Israelis are doubtful that the target date of 2008 can be met. Israeli defense officials are particularly cynical about the Palestinian Authority’s ability to fulfill its security requirements, let alone implement them in Hamas-controlled Gaza.
 
From Speechmaking to Peacemaking
 
With so many possibilities for failure, creating a successful process out of the Annapolis conference may very well entail focusing on the small details. Many of those details were already known before the noteworthy speeches. The hope that a Palestinian state would be announced before the end of Bush’s term came as no surprise to anyone. Neither did the choice of the roadmap as the mechanism to lead the negotiations, whose implementation is more essential to a successful peace process then a tentative date for completion. As expected, the joint understanding, as well as the three speeches, named the implementation of the roadmap as the key to a resolution and announced that the United States would oversee its success.
 
The challenges facing Olmert and Abbas on their arrival home are also well-known. Abbas returns with a promise of a unified Palestinian state to a people divided between Fatah and Hamas rule. These divisions erupted in violence when a Palestinian was killed at an anti-Annapolis protest, called for by Hamas. The internal Palestinian clashes that accompanied Annapolis are a distressing reminder that the Palestinian public will bear the brunt of Hamas-Fatah conflicts over the Israeli-Palestinian process. Olmert returns to the possibility of indictment on corruption charges. Even if he is not indicted, he will still face dissension within his own party as well as continuing threats from members of his government who promise to leave his coalition if significant concessions are made. Olmert’s political status could suffer further from the conclusions of the second Winograd Commission report investigating government conduct during the Hezbollah-Israel war, due to be released shortly.
 
What remains unclear is how active a role the United States will take in resolving the pre-existing disagreements over how to interpret and achieve the roadmap requirements along a timetable that has not yet been established. The various challenges awaiting Abbas and Olmert at home assure that the Americans will have to play an intensified role for the process to succeed. There will surely be input from Europe and the Quartet and attempts at intervention or interference from both Arab states who participated in the conference and spoilers who were left out.
 
The proof may very well be in the pudding.  Continued focus on the significant details of a negotiating process, such as setting substantial and reachable goals and effectively monitoring their implementation on reasonable timetables, will be the measuring stick for success—whether in Washington, Riyadh, Damascus, or, most importantly, in Jerusalem and Ramallah.   Above all, as Annapolis demonstrated clearly once again, if American stewardship is not ever-present, the constituents are likely to go their own ways, without resolving any of their deep and continuing disputes, no matter how well-intentioned Abbas and Olmert may be.