Hardly a day goes by without some new twist in the preparations for the Annapolis conference, and speculation is rife on whether it will end in success or failure. The Israeli prime minister is trying to lower expectations, emphasizing that it is not a peace conference but a starting point for negotiations toward a peace accord. The Palestinian president has his eye on the day after Annapolis, pushing for a time limit on the negotiations that will follow the event.

The truth is that the summit itself cannot fail, because nothing will be left to chance. Every effort will be made to reach agreement on the joint declaration in advance, and if it is not sewn up, there will be no conference. That outcome, however, is highly unlikely. All the key players want to put on a good show for their respective audiences and know the cost of a flop. They will take to the stage with their lines well rehearsed and – supported by extras from the Arab League - will lock arms as they take their collective bow at the end. The curtain will fall, and only then will the real drama begin.

In his speech before the Saban Forum, Prime Minister Olmert stressed his commitment to negotiations. Ongoing negotiations, in the words of the prime minister; open-ended negotiations, if he has his way. Olmert is insistent that there be no timetable, although he has said that he hopes to sign an agreement by the end of President Bush's term. Note that the operative term here is sign, not implement. Deputy Premier Haim Ramon has suggested that the talks should begin with the broader issues on which there is agreement, leaving the disagreements for a later stage. Ramon appears to have learned nothing from Oslo, and all the talk about talking leads one to suspect that the Israeli government is studying a different history lesson.

Shortly after his defeat in the 1992 elections, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who headed the Israeli delegation to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, was quoted in a Ma'ariv interview as admitting that his intention had been to drag out negotiations with the Palestinians for a decade while continuing to strengthen the Jewish presence in the occupied territories.

Although he was not the one to accomplish it, Shamir's plan to talk and build has succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. When he left office there were just over 100,000 settlers in the West Bank; today, they number close to 270,000. As they went from Madrid to Oslo to Wye River to Camp David to Sharm el-Sheikh, successive Israeli governments have talked, talked, talked and built, built, built.

Now, as he packs his bags for Annapolis, Olmert is taking pains to make it clear that the intention is to keep on talking. As long as he talks, his right-wing coalition partners will sit tight. Lieberman and Yishai may present red lines, but no one's going anywhere until something actually happens on the ground, and nothing's going to happen as long as Israel sticks to its position that implementation hinges on the first stage of the Road Map and that the first stage begins with Israel's security. Appearing before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Monday, Olmert explained that although he has agreed to discuss final-status issues, Israel will not have to do anything until the Palestinians dismantle the terror infrastructure.

Which brings us to another chapter in our history lesson. This time, we are looking at April 2003 and the publication of the Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Most Israelis will be surprised to learn that nowhere in Phase One does it say that Israel's commitment to dismantle the illegal outposts and freeze all settlement activity is contingent upon and subsequent to the success of the Palestinian Authority's fight against terrorism.

In fact, Ahmad Qureia has solid grounds for arguing that the Palestinians have fulfilled their part of the deal, which calls for "visible efforts" against those planning or perpetrating acts of violence. It is true that these efforts have not brought tranquility to the residents of Sderot and the western Negev, but neither did the IDF's Summer Rains or Autumn Clouds operations, and neither will the next meteorological euphemism for death and destruction being cooked up by the defense minister.

Olmert is certainly justified in insisting that Israel will not compromise when it comes to its security, but he doesn't seem to have been able to connect the dots that lead from occupation to terror.

The expectation that Mahmoud Abbas will be able to quell all acts of violence while the occupation continues is unreasonable. Gestures, confidence-building measures, and the promise of a diplomatic horizon are not enough. The Palestinians no longer shiver with excitement as the words "Palestinian state" roll off the tongue of the Israeli prime minister. They want to know when, and the argument that timetables complicate things because deadlines inevitably slip only strengthens their suspicion that Israel has no intention of ever getting from process to end-state.

The latest Tel Aviv University peace index showed a strong correlation between the number of Israelis who believe that peace is vital to Israel and the number who believe that the Palestinians constitute a threat. Conversely, the less they feel threatened, the less interest Israelis have in achieving peace. Apparently, a majority of Israelis are not troubled by the injustice of the occupation and do not consider peace a value in and of itself. Security, it seems, is the mother of stagnation. And that is the sorriest lesson of all.