JUST how divided is Hamas? Since the Islamist party took over the Gaza Strip in June, after months of violent clashes with the rival, secular-minded Fatah faction, Israel and the rest of the world have imposed an economic siege on the strip. Many perceive signs that Hamas is splitting under the pressure. That, in turn, has raised the prospect of Hamas becoming a busted flush—or of a moderate wing emerging that could do business with Fatah, rebuild a broader Palestinian front and perhaps even agree to the conditions that would enable it to negotiate with Israel.

Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas's politburo, lives in exile in Damascus and reports to a council that takes decisions by consensus. But the physical separation between Hamas members in Damascus, the West Bank, Gaza and Israeli jails have created sub-leaderships, each with its own ideological nuances. Ismail Haniyeh, who was the Palestinian prime minister from Hamas's election victory in 2006 until the president, Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas, dismissed him after the June showdown, is Hamas's political leader in Gaza. But already in June he seemed to have little control over the military wing which led the push against Fatah. That has led to much speculation over whether the militias' real commander is Mr Meshal or two hardline former members of Mr Haniyeh's cabinet, Mahmoud Zahar and Said Siam.

Recently Hamas-watchers have seized on more hints of division. Last week Nizar Rayan, another Gaza hardliner, bragged that by next autumn Hamas would be praying in the muqata, Mr Abbas's compound in the West Bank town of Ramallah. Four West Bank Hamas men, including Mr Haniyeh's erstwhile deputy, Nasser al-Shaer, responded with a conciliatory press conference, after which Mr Abbas invited them to the muqata to pray with him.

But while the four proudly touted a thaw in relations with Fatah, some Hamas spokesmen in Gaza played it down. Two days later, when Mr Haniyeh gave a speech reiterating his frequent calls for dialogue with Fatah and denying any intention to take the West Bank by force, Mr Zahar was conspicuously absent. Mr Meshal's deputy in Damascus, Musa abu Marzuk, then appeared to paper over the cracks by repeating Mr Haniyeh's message. Hamas-watchers have seized on other signs of friction, such as a letter published by Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas journalist who became its government spokesman, bitterly criticising Hamas's past mistakes.

The trouble with this Kremlinological analysis is that few observers are neutral. Most of those who see a split are Americans, Israelis and pro-Fatah Palestinians with an interest in portraying Hamas as divided and becoming more extreme. An expert at Conflicts Forum, whose co-director, Alastair Crooke, a British former diplomat, has dealt extensively with Hamas, says that “so far as I can tell, the guy who makes the decisions is still Meshal and the so-called radicals are not a majority force.” But Conflicts Forum also has an agenda: to promote Western dialogue with Islamists and boost the moderates among them.

Some say that, despite previously rejecting talks with Hamas, Mr Abbas now needs to reach out to it to mitigate the isolation he will suffer if an Israeli-Palestinian summit due at the end of this month in Annapolis produces—as looks increasingly likely—no tangible advances towards a Palestinian state. But others think he is using the contact with West Bank leaders to encourage a split in Hamas.

In any event, if Mr Abbas's goal is reconciliation, it is not close. At their meeting, Mr Abbas told the West Bank leaders that Hamas must return all the Fatah bases and weapons it captured in June before dialogue can begin. Hamas, by contrast, says dialogue must be unconditional. And if Mr Abbas wants to provoke a split, he seems unlikely to get more than a splinter. Mr Shaer and his West Bank colleagues are known as extreme moderates within Hamas; so is Mr Hamad, the former spokesman. Qaddoura Fares, a Fatah leader in the West Bank, says he has had calls from three well-known Hamas moderates in Gaza trying to re-establish dialogue, and told them to show their goodwill and influence by having them stop Hamas-run media outlets from vilifying Fatah. “They haven't called me back,” he says.