American President George Bush's call for an international conference in the autumn has, on the face of it, created a diplomatic horizon. The overt diplomatic arena, and apparently also the covert one, is teeming with activity while the American patron is trying to arrange a gathering that will be suited to all its participants. This conference is likely to be the finale of the Bush era, and therefore, from the American point of view, it must succeed.

First and foremost, Bush was motivated to initiate an international conference to compensate for the continuous American failures in the Middle East. Quite possibly the post-Saddam era Middle East is neither more stable nor more secure. The opposite is true: the anarchy in Iraq; the strengthening of Iran and of the Shi'ites in the Arab world, including Hezbollah; the rise to power of Hamas in Gaza; and the continued growth of Al-Qaida cells - all prove that the region still has the potential to threaten the world order. Moreover, beyond considerations of prestige, the issue of the continued flow of oil at reasonable prices is most important to the West, while, in effect, the price of a barrel of oil is rising daily. In view of all these concerns, progress in solving the Israeli-Arab conflict is likely, according to the American concept, to assist in lessening the threats in other sectors and to increase regional stability. The international conference, therefore, is a tool for providing momentum to the diplomatic negotiations in the hope this will lead to progress in solving other problems in the Middle East. The idea of a conference is not a bad one. It ensures that the regional agenda will not be fixed and ruled by radical Islamic elements. It is a convenient opportunity for the moderate voices in the Arab world to speak together - both openly and clandestinely - to battle those elements that even in their eyes are considered dangerous. Indeed, the visits to Israel of the Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers as representatives of the Arab League (even though they were not officially portrayed this way); the meeting of foreign ministers from Arab states in Egypt; the visits of Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates to the region; and the United States arms deal with Saudi Arabia, all reveal an extraordinary diplomatic momentum that is aimed at preparing the ground for the international conference.

Numerous signs indicate that the Saudi kingdom will be represented at the conference at the price of the $20 billion American-Saudi arms deal. No doubt, the participation of the Saudis at this conference is most vital, as it will grant Islamic legitimacy to any move. Saudi Arabia has an interest in moving forward a conference of this type, strengthening its status in Washington as the most important Arab ally and its status in the Arab world. The conference also constitutes a natural continuation of the Arab peace plan that began at as Saudi initiative in 2002.

At the same time, the conference also raises quite a few difficulties. Apparently the U.S.and Israel are determined to focus on the Palestinian track, and to make progress on this track, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is currently proposing the negotiation of an agreement on principles only, which will form the basis for future talks on a final-status solution. In this way, Olmert is returning to the well-established Israeli pattern of preferring negotiations on the Palestinian track to making progress on the Syrian track.

This preference, which is being made in an open and crude fashion, may once again push Syria toward radical demands. In reality, the Syrian policy is at present moving along two parallel tracks: One is the call for peace negotiations with Israel; and the other is intensive contact with Iran and with Hezbollah. These two lines are not mutually exclusive but rather are aimed at complementing one another: The strengthening of the alliance with Iran, the funding of arms purchases from Russia and the operation of Hezbollah are all intended to serve as means of strengthening Syria's bargaining power vis a vis the U.S. and Israel.

Hints about clandestine Israeli-Syrian negotiations through a third party have flourished recently. Even though this channel has so far not produced results, Israel and the U.S. must not alienate Syria and leave it watching the international conference from afar. If it is left out, Syria will promote difficulties in terms of holding the conference and may even try to torpedo it. It is worth remembering that the Arab peace plan, which will undoubtedly form an important basis for the conference discussions, also includes a reference to the Syrian and Lebanese arena.

The Palestinian track is also likely to lead to many difficulties. Unlike the past, when the Palestinians had an agreed-on and elected representation, the current division between two leaderships - Fatah and Hamas - does not augur well. Any progress with elements in the Palestinian Authority that recognize Israel could come up against a veto from Hamas, which represents a large segment of the Palestinian population. The overt and callous attempt also on the part of the U.S. and Israel to strengthen Abu Mazen (PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas), even if it helps him in the short run, is likely to turn into a double-edged sword in the long run. Hamas could turn for help to regional elements that are interested in torpedoing any diplomatic initiative - including Syria if it is left out in the cold - and could denounce any agreement Abu Mazen might make with Israel as "betraying" the Palestinian cause or cause difficulties with its implementation if it does not torpedo it completely.

The hope is that a move with a large number of participants under a pan-Arab aegis will grant legitimacy to any diplomatic process and will push Hamas into a corner. At this stage, the organization, it seems, has not yet regained its strength after the shock it experienced following its success in gaining control of Gaza and as well as the shock from the swift countersteps adopted by Abu Mazen. Apparently Hamas is still weighing its options. In theory, Hamas could allow Abu Mazen a certain diplomatic leeway on the assumption that he would get for Hamas what it could not get for itself unless it renounced the principle of non-recognition of Israel. Hamas may hope that eventually it would be able to gain control also in the "liberated" West Bank.

The current format of the conference does not indicate that the Lebanese track will be taken into account. There is a struggle now in Lebanon that symbolizes the struggle in the entire Middle East. The upcoming presidential elections will face off candidates who are being supported by Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and candidates who are identified with the camp that opposes these forces, with the division cutting across ethnic groups.

The exclusion of Lebanon from the conference was done perhaps out of considerations of not wanting to escalate the already shaky internal situation there, but just as the West tries to strengthen Abu Mazen in various ways, so it is worthwhile strengthening Fuad Siniora's pro-Western government by inviting it to the conference. Any resolution that is adopted by the conference will enjoy the legitimacy of almost all the Arab states and in this way will be able to strengthen the chances of its implementation inside Lebanon, where Hezbollah can be expected to oppose it.

Despite all these difficulties, and despite all the risks, the conference must be held. In an article in Haaretz a few weeks ago, I proposed that a regional conference be called, and that it be split up into several tracks, just like the Madrid Conference in 1991. A conference of this kind could, on the face of it, focus on the Palestinian track, as it seems to be doing now, but focusing on this track alone, which is tied up not only with Israeli-Palestinian problems, but also mainly with intra-Palestinian problems, increases the chances that the conference will fail, a situation that would undoubtedly cause the region to heat up and provide additional support for radical Palestinian forces. Therefore it is preferable to expand the circle of Arab countries that are participating.

Finales do not carry a message for the future but rather sum up a period and grant a sense - however fleeting - of elevation of the spirit. But all the participants are arriving at this finale tired and worn-out. One hopes a conference will succeed at least in creating a momentum that will constitute a convenient infrastructure for a more daring American leader, one who will have better success at pulling the wagon of Middle East negotiations up the steep hill.