Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are both experienced politicians. At least for the moment, they seem perfectly capable of ignoring the internal political critics of their negotiations. And there is a lot to ignore. Indeed, one could argue that in their shared predicament the two leaders' only realistic political alternative if they want to survive is "fuit en avant", keeping an innovative step ahead with the objective of achieving something so significant that ultimately it will neutralize their critics. In other words, Olmert and Abbas cannot stand still or they will certainly endanger their positions; they must display constant movement to keep their political enemies off balance and the public in a state of anticipation, even if chances of success are extremely limited.

Olmert faces not only the official parliamentary opposition led by Binyamin Netanyahu, the Likud and the settlers. Within his coalition he faces overt criticism on the left from Labor leader Ehud Barak, who cautions against making any near-term territorial concessions to the Abbas-Fayyad government with its lack of security authority, and from the Yisrael Beitenu and Shas parties on the right, whose tolerance for Olmert's peace efforts the prime minister seeks to recruit by embracing their domestic policy initiatives.

The conventional wisdom would have Olmert saying to himself that if both the left and the right are unhappy, he, the centrist, must be doing something right. But he also faces open expressions of concern within his own Kadima party, with former minister of defense Shaul Mofaz more or less identifying with Barak's security worries. Finally, Olmert must contend with extremely low public approval ratings, coupled with the threat of several judicial/police investigations and the specter of an imminent warning from the Winograd commission that his standing will be hurt by its findings.

Abbas must contend with Hamas, which, while acknowledging his mandate to negotiate, signals that it will reject any agreement based on Palestinian concessions. With the Palestinian parliamentary system in collapse and Abbas arbitrarily changing the electoral system for the next round--if there is one--Hamas will almost certainly rely on violence to thwart any significant progress registered by the president. In this sense, unlike in Israel, in Palestine the primary opposition to negotiations fits the contours of civil war more than democracy or even a semi-democratic system. There is additional criticism of Abbas from within his own Fateh party and traditionally allied parties, but it does not pose a physical threat to his plans and Abbas has not hesitated to distance the critics from his decision-making system.

Certainly, each of the two leaders must contend with a political system that makes it extremely difficult to move toward a Palestinian-Israeli solution. Abbas' own party, Fateh, is in disarray, while he has forfeited his majority to Hamas. Olmert knows that every governing coalition in Jerusalem over the past 20 years has fallen over the Palestinian issue.

While Olmert and Abbas' need to maintain a certain political momentum is logical, their chosen field of activism--a declaration of principles to be endorsed at a conference in Washington in November by the international community and moderate Arab neighbors--is not. Abbas has virtually no chance of getting a statement from Olmert that will satisfy Hamas or even provide the West Bank public with the instant satisfaction of genuine political movement. It would be a far safer bet and more constructive approach for him to concentrate on extracting confidence-building measures (prisoner release, funds, removal of West Bank checkpoints) from Israel and the Quartet, while rebuilding security institutions and rejuvenating his Fateh party.

Olmert, too, stands little chance of emerging from the Washington meeting--if he even gets there--with a peace process that is marketable to the Israeli public and his coalition partners. And he, too, has better alternatives: the same accelerated CBM route with Abbas and/or a more concerted effort to open negotiations with Syria.

Finally, both leaders' scheme for "fuit en avant" seems at this point in danger of being scuttled by a renewed outbreak of violence between Israel and either Syria/Hizballah in the north or Hamas in Gaza. If and when that happens, Olmert and Abbas' many political opponents will judge them by the leadership skills they display under fire rather than in the conference room.